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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, : 
v. : 
JOSEPH P. TUNZI, : Case No. 20010676-SC 
Defendant/Respondent. : Priority No. 13 
JURISDICTION 
This Court granted the state's petition for writ of certiorari. This Court therefore 
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 2001). 
OPINION BELOW 
State v. TunzL 2001 UT App 224, 31 P.3d 588 (" Tunzi") is in Addendum A. 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON CERTIORARI AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue. Respondent/Defendant Joseph P. Tunzi ("Joseph11 or "Respondent'1) was 
bound over from juvenile court to district court on the charge of attempted homicide 
pursuant to the Serious Youth Offender Act. A jury acquitted Joseph of attempted 
homicide but convicted him of a lesser offense which is not a Serious Youth Offender 
offense. Did the Court of Appeals correctly conclude that the district court lost 
jurisdiction when Joseph was acquitted of the serious offense which provided the basis 
for the bindover and convicted of a lesser, non-serious youth offender offense? 
Standard of Review. On certiorari, this Court reviews the conclusion of the Court 
of Appeals for correctness. State v. Layman. 1999 UT 79, ^ [3, 985 P.2d 911 (further 
citation omitted). This issue involves a question of statutory interpretation and therefore 
the standard of review employed by the Court of Appeals was a review for correctness. 
See Tunzi, 2001 UT App 224, f7 (citing Adkins v. Uncle Bart's Inc.. 2000 UT 14, Tfl 1, 
1 P. 3d 528). 
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 (1996) is determinative of the issue on certiorari. 
The text of that statute is in Addendum B. The texts of the recent amendment to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 , the direct file statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-601 (1996) and 
the certification statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-603 (1996), are also in Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The state filed an Information dated November 5, 1998 in juvenile court, charging 
Joseph with attempted criminal homicide, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-5-203 & 76-4-101 (1999). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 
(1996), the juvenile court bound Joseph over to district court for trial. R. 11-12. 
A jury trial was held on April 22-23, 1999. R. 76-7. Although the elements of 
aggravated assault were not necessarily included in the charge of attempted homicide, the 
state requested and received an instruction for that offense. R. 64, 73, 98. The jury 
acquitted Joseph of attempted homicide, the charge which had provided the basis for the 
2 
bindover, and convicted him of aggravated assault. R. 77, 108. Because the aggravated 
assault elements instruction contained elements for both the third and second degree 
felony versions of aggravated assault, the trial judge entered judgment for the third 
degree felony and sentenced Joseph to serve zero to five years at the Utah State Prison.1 
R. 117-19. Prior to sentencing, Joseph moved to transfer the case back to juvenile court 
because the jury had acquitted him of the Serious Youth Offender charge which provided 
the basis for the bindover and convicted him of a charge which is not a Serious Youth 
Offender offense. R. 222:5-8. The trial court denied the motion. R. 222:11.2 
Joseph directly appealed his conviction to the Utah Court of Appeals, and moved 
for summary reversal when it was discovered that the videotape and transcript of one day 
of the two-day trial were missing. R. 136, 141:194. The Court of Appeals denied that 
motion and remanded the case to the trial court for reconstruction of the record. On 
certiorari, this Court summarily reversed that decision and remanded the case for a new 
trial. State v. TunzL 2000 UT 38, 998 P.2d 816 (" Tunzi l") is in Addendum C. 
1
 The instruction for aggravated assault contained alternative elements for both the 
second and third degree felony versions of that crime. R. 96. The second degree felony 
version requires serious bodily injury whereas the third degree felony version requires 
use of a dangerous weapon. Because of the ambiguous verdict, Joseph argued and the 
state agreed that he must be convicted of the lesser third degree felony. R. 142:2-4. 
Based on defendant's motion, the state's stipulation and good cause, the judge ordered 
that Joseph be sentenced for third degree felony aggravated assault. 
2
 Second degree felony aggravated assault, causing serious bodily injury, is a 
Serious Youth Offender offense, whereas third degree felony aggravated assault, using a 
deadly weapon, is not a Serious Youth Offender offense. 
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On remand, the state attempted to proceed with a second degree felony charge of 
aggravated assault even though Joseph had been convicted of only a third degree felony 
in the original proceedings. R. 158-75. The state subsequently offered Joseph, who was 
in the custody of the Utah State Prison or Salt Lake County jail throughout the 
proceedings, a plea bargain whereby Joseph would plead guilty to a third degree felony 
and be given credit for time served and released. R. 223:2-5. Joseph ultimately accepted 
the plea bargain and pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, a third degree felony; the trial 
judge gave Joseph credit for time served and he was released. R. 223:9-10. Joseph 
appealed his conviction for the sole purpose of returning this case to juvenile court. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in failing to remand 
the case to the juvenile court after Joseph was acquitted of attempted homicide and 
convicted of a non-Serious Youth Offender offense. Tunzi, 2001 UT App 224, ^ [1, 13 
("Upon the finding of not guilty of attempted murder and the court's decision to grant 
Tunzi's motion to enter a conviction of third degree felony aggravated assault, the 
juvenile court regained jurisdiction over Tunzi.... Accordingly, we conclude that the 
trial court erred when it denied Tunzi's motion to transfer jurisdiction back to the 
juvenile court prior to entry of his conviction.1'). The Court of Appeals nvacate[d] 
Tunzi's conviction and remand[ed] to the district court with instructions to transfer the 
case to the juvenile court for entry of an adjudication of guilt for third degree felony 
aggravated assault." Tunzi, 2001 UT App 224, [^19. 
4 
The state filed a timely petition for writ of certiorari, which this Court granted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
While the facts of the underlying incident are not pertinent to the issue on appeal, 
they provide background. On Halloween night, 1998, a fight occurred in which Rocky 
Vigil was stabbed. R. 141. The factual issue at trial was whether Joseph or his cousin, 
Zeb Smith, stabbed Rocky. R. 141. None of the witnesses on the first day of trial 
testified that Joseph was the person who stabbed Rocky; some of the witnesses did, 
however, implicate Zeb as the stabber. See e ^ R . 141:101, 103-05, 111, 128-29. Zeb 
was originally suspected of being the stabber and made inconsistent statements to 
officers regarding statements Joseph had allegedly made. R. 58-9, 81. 
Zeb Smith testified against Joseph on the second day of trial. R. 77. Since a 
transcript of the second day of trial does not exist, the details of Zeb's testimony are 
unknown. 
Rocky suffered extensive injuries as the result of the stabbing, as outlined in the 
state's brief ("S.B.") at 5. The state fails to acknowledge, however, that despite these 
extensive injuries, the jury acquitted Joseph of attempted homicide. See S.B. at 5, 10. 
This acquittal in the face of such extensive injuries suggests that the jury found that 
Joseph was not the stabber. In light of the testimony at the trial implicating Zeb as the 
stabber, additional testimony that Joseph had a knife in his possession (R. 141:139) and 
the jury's acquittal of Joseph on the attempted homicide charge, it appears likely that the 
5 
jury convicted Joseph for aggravated assault based on the use of a dangerous weapon, 
but did not find that Joseph inflicted the extensive injuries which Rocky sustained. 
Moreover, the conviction in this case is based on the use of a dangerous weapon rather 
than the infliction of serious bodily injury. R. 204-05. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the Serious Youth Offender Act 
("the Act") required that this case be remanded to juvenile court when Joseph was 
acquitted of attempted homicide. The plain language of the Act required this conclusion 
since attempted homicide was the only charge in this case and Joseph was acquitted of 
that charge. 
The remainder of the Act supports the Court of Appeals' conclusion that this case 
should be remanded to the juvenile court. The term "charges" is used throughout the 
Act, with only one exception, to refer to the Serious Youth Offender offense which 
provided the basis for transfer to district court. Additionally, subsection (7) indicates that 
in order to qualify as a "charge," the charge must be set forth in the information and the 
juvenile judge must find that there is probable cause to support the charge. In this case, 
attempted homicide was the only charge which fit these requirements. Moreover, 
aggravated assault was not necessarily included in the charge of attempted homicide. 
Because there are additional elements in aggravated assault, the juvenile judge did not 
implicitly find probable cause to bind Joseph over on aggravated assault, and aggravated 
6 
assault therefore cannot be a "charge" under subsections (7) and (10). 
The purpose for which the Act was adopted also supports the Court of Appeals' 
conclusion. The Legislature intended that violent juveniles who commit serious offenses 
be transferred to the adult system and suffer adult consequences. When the juvenile is 
acquitted of the serious offense, the reasons for the bindover no longer exist. 
Reading the Act in harmony with the direct file and certification statutes also 
supports the Court of Appeals' decision. The direct file and certification statutes contain 
language which is distinct from that of the Act. The distinctions between the language in 
the certification and direct file statutes and the language of the Act demonstrate further 
that the Act required remand to the juvenile court. 
The state has not offered any basis for departing from the plain language of the 
Act and accepted rules of statutory construction. Instead of analyzing the Act pursuant to 
the rules of statutory construction, the state complains that the procedure outlined by the 
Act and embraced by the Court of Appeals is unworkable and has been rejected by every 
other state to consider it. The state also claims the amendment to the Act passed after 
this case was on certiorari applies retroactively to this case. These arguments fail. 
The procedure required by the Act and upheld by the Court of Appeals provides a 
fair and practicable approach. Contrary to the state's assumption, a district court trying a 
Serious Youth Offender case could and must give lesser instructions where appropriate. 
If a juvenile is acquitted by a jury or pleads to a lesser offense, the case can be remanded 
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at that point prior to sentencing. A juvenile judge who does not preside over a trial 
nevertheless is able to making sentencing decisions and decisions on any motion for new 
trial. 
The state is incorrect when it claims all other states which have considered this 
procedure have rejected it. A number of states utilize a similar procedure, reasoning that 
remand is required when the juvenile is convicted of a lesser offense because (1) the 
juvenile committed a delinquency rather than a crime and is not criminally responsible 
for the lesser offense; (2) the policies of the juvenile system are furthered when a case is 
remanded after the juvenile is acquitted of the offense which provided the basis for the 
transfer; and (3) fairness requires that a juvenile convicted of a lesser crime be treated the 
same as all other juveniles who are adjudicated guilty of the same offense. 
The recent amendment to subsection (10) of the Act does not apply to this case. 
Retroactive application of the amendment violates Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (2000) and 
the state and federal constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED 
THAT THE JUVENILE COURT REGAINED JURISDICTION WHEN 
JOSEPH WAS ACQUITTED OF THE SERIOUS YOUTH OFFENDER 
CHARGE WHICH PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR THE BINDOVER. 
The Serious Youth Offender Act5 Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 (1996), allows the 
juvenile court to transfer a juvenile sixteen years or older to district court for trial on 
certain specified violent felony charges. The Act designates nine serious, violent 
8 
felonies which can be tried in district court if the juvenile court finds probable cause to 
believe the juvenile committed the crime and the juvenile court finds further that the 
juvenile does not meet all three of the retention factors set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-
3a-602(3)(b). Because one of the retention factors requires a finding "that the minor's 
role in the offense was not committed in a violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner11 
(Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(3)(b)(iii)), the vast majority of juveniles are not able to 
meet the retention factors since the felonies listed in subsection (1) are by their very 
nature violent, aggressive, or premeditated. The essential basis for transferring a case to 
district court under the Act is therefore the charge that the juvenile committed a serious 
and violent felony. 
The version of subsection (10) of the Act in effect at the time of the crime, trial 
and Court of Appeals' decision3, required that the juvenile court regain jurisdiction if 
there was an acquittal or dismissal of the charges. It states, ,f[t]he juvenile court under 
Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of Youth Corrections regain jurisdiction and any 
authority previously exercised over the juvenile when there is an acquittal, a finding of 
not guilty, or dismissal of the charges in the district court.11 The Court of Appeals 
correctly concluded that subsections (3)(b) and (10) of the Act f,define[] the jurisdictional 
3
 Subsection (10) of the Act was amended by the Legislature earlier this year. 
Respondent refers to the version of subsection (10) in effect when he was tried 
throughout this brief and refers to the recent change as the amendment. Application of 
the amendment to this case would violate Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (2000) and the state 
and federal prohibitions against ex post facto laws. See discussion infra at 36-50. 
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parameters of both the juvenile court and the district court in those instances when a 
minor is charged with one of the offenses listed in section 78-3a-602(l)(a)." Tunzi, 2001 
UT App 224, f 10. Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that subsection 
(10) required that the juvenile court regained jurisdiction "[u]pon the finding of not 
guilty of attempted murder and the court's decision to grant Tunzi's motion to enter a 
conviction of third degree felony aggravated assault." Tunzi. 2001 UT App 224, ^13. 
A. The Court of Appeals Correctly Concluded that Subsection (10) 
Required that the Case Be Remanded to the Juvenile Court. 
The language of subsection (10) required that the juvenile court regain jurisdiction 
when there was an acquittal or dismissal "of the charges in district court." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-3a-602(10) (1996). The Court of Appeals held that the "charges" referred to 
in subsection (10) are the Serious Youth Offender charges enumerated in section 78-3a-
602(1) which provide the basis for a transfer to district court. Tunzi. 2001 UT App 224, 
[^13 ("Upon the finding of not guilty of attempted murder and the court's decision to 
grant Tunzi's motion to enter a conviction of third degree felony aggravated assault, the 
juvenile court regained jurisdiction over Tunzi because there was 4a finding of not guilty 
[and] dismissal of the charges [enumerated in section 78-3a-602(l) and allowing bind-
over to] district court.'" (brackets in original)). This conclusion that the "charges" 
referred to in subsection (10) are the Serious Youth Offender charges enumerated in 
subsection (1) is consistent with the plain language of subsection (10), the remainder of 
the Act, legislative history, the purpose for which the Act was enacted, and a comparison 
10 
of the language of the Act with the language of the certification and direct file statutes. 
The plain language of subsection (10) required that the juvenile court regain 
jurisdiction if the there was an acquittal or a dismissal of the "charges." Statutes found in 
Chapter 3 a of Title 78, including the Serious Youth Offender Act, "are not part of the 
criminal code, but are part of the Juvenile Courts Act; they "were promulgated with 
juvenile procedures and issues in mind and were meant to apply to the juvenile context." 
State v. Harrison, 2001 UT 33, ^17, 24 P.3d 936. Since the Act discusses proceedings in 
juvenile court, the term "charges" in subsection (10) necessarily refers to charges which 
are outlined in the information filed in juvenile court and which provide the basis for the 
bindover. In this case, the only "charge" in the information filed in district court was 
attempted murder. When Joseph was acquitted of that charge, the plain language of 
subsection (10) required that this case be remanded to the juvenile court. See State in the 
Interest of A.B.. 936 P.2d 1091, 1097 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (where the language of a 
statute is plain and unambiguous, the statute will ordinarily be interpreted pursuant to its 
plain language). 
While the plain language of subsection (10) required that the case be remanded to 
the juvenile court when Joseph was acquitted of the only "charge" in the information, 
resort to rules of statutory construction beyond the plain language likewise establishes 
that the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the juvenile court regained jurisdiction 
when Joseph was acquitted of attempted homicide. ."[I]f there is doubt or uncertainty as 
11 
to the meaning or application of the provisions of an act, it is appropriate to analyze the 
act in its entirety, in light of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance 
with its intent and purpose." State v. Souza. 846 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
(citations and quotations omitted). In addition, when a statute is ambiguous, "'resort to 
legislative history and purpose for guidance"1 is appropriate. State in the interest of 
A.B.. 936 P.2d at 1097 (citing State v. Valdez. 933 P. 2d 400, 401 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)) 
(further citation omitted). Moreover, the Act must be read in harmony with related 
statutes, "in this case, Utah's two other statutes for prosecuting youthful offenders." 
State in the interest of A.B., 936 P.2d at 1097 (citation omitted). 
When the Act is read in its entirety, it is apparent that the "charges" referred to in 
subsection (10) are the charges which provided the basis for the bindover, and subsection 
(10) therefore required that a case be remanded to the juvenile court when the juvenile 
was acquitted of the serious offense which provided the basis for the transfer to district 
court. The focus throughout the Act is on the charges enumerated in subsection (1) 
which provide the basis for the transfer to district court. The Act enumerates the charges 
which qualify for Serious Youth Offender treatment, then discusses the procedure to be 
utilized for determining whether the case will be transferred to district court based on the 
filing of the charges enumerated in subsection (1). In fact, all but one of the ten 
subsections of the Act pertain solely to the charges filed in the information which may 
provide a basis for transfer to district court. Hence, when the Act is read as a whole, it is 
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apparent that the "charges" referred to in subsection (10) are the charges outlined in 
subsection (1) which provide the basis for transfer to district court. 
The term "charges" is used in the Act for the most part to refer to the charges 
which provide the basis for the bindover to district court. For example, subsection (2) 
uses the term "charges" to refer to the charges in subsection (1). It states, "[a]ll 
proceedings before the juvenile court related to charges filed under subsection (1) shall 
be conducted in conformity with the rules established by the Utah Supreme Court." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 (2) (emphasis added). 
Subsection (7) also uses the term "charges" to refer primarily to the charges 
enumerated in subsection (1) which provide the basis for the transfer to district court. 
Subsection (7) states: 
(7) When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the 
same information or indictment and is bound over to answer in the district 
court for one or more charges under this section, other offenses arising 
from the same criminal episode and any subsequent misdemeanors or 
felonies charged against him shall be considered together with those 
charges, and where the court finds probable cause to believe that those 
crimes have been committed and that the defendant committed them, the 
defendant shall also be bound over to district court to answer for those 
charges. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(7) (1996). This subsection uses the term "charges" to twice 
refer to the charges enumerated in subsection (1) which provided the basis for the 
transfer to district court. While subsection (7) also uses the term "charges" to once refer 
to charges which are tacked on after a case is bound over pursuant to the Act, it uses the 
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term "charges" primarily to refer to the charges which provide the basis for the transfer to 
district court. The single use of the term "charges" in subsection (7) to refer to 
something other than the charges which provide the basis for the bindover does not 
override the multiple use of that term to refer to the charges which provide the basis for 
the transfer or the focus of the Act in general on the charges which provide the basis for 
the transfer. 
The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that subsection (7) does not change the 
meaning of the term "charges" to include charges other than those which provide the 
basis for the transfer to district court. Tunzi, 2001 UT App 224, ^14-16. The Court of 
Appeals dispensed with the state's claim that all offenses must be dismissed, not just 
those that provide the basis for the bindover, by pointing out that subsection (7) requires 
that offenses be charged in an information and the juvenile court must find probable 
cause in order for those charges to be tacked on and treated as subsection (7) offenses. 
Id., f^ 15-16. Because the state charged Joseph with only attempted murder and no other 
offenses were included in an information or brought before the juvenile court judge for a 
probable cause finding, the Court of Appeals recognized that no offense other than 
attempted murder could be considered a "charge" under the Act. In other words, since 
the state did not request the lesser until district court, the only "charge" which was 
considered in the juvenile court and which therefore could qualify as a charge under the 
Act was attempted homicide. The Court of Appeals stated: 
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While subsection 7 allows the district court to exercise jurisdiction 
over other offenses arising out of (and after) the violent felony enumerated 
in section 78-3a-602(l) and allowing bind-over, the plain language of 
subsection 7 requires that these offenses be charged in the same 
information [citation omitted]. In addition, subsection 7 requires the 
juvenile court to "find [] probable cause to believe that those crimes have 
been committed and that the defendant committed them M [Citation 
omitted.] 
Here, the State charged Tunzi in the same information with the 
single offense of attempted murder. The State did not charge Tunzi with 
"multiple criminal offenses in the same information[,]" and the juvenile 
court's bind-over did not necessarily include a finding of "probable cause 
to believe that those crimes have been committed and that the defendant 
committed them . . . . " [Citation omitted.] Consequently, the third degree 
felony aggravated assault was not an "other offense" under subsection 7, 
and the district court did not have jurisdiction to enter a conviction 
therefore. [Citation omitted.] 
Tunzi, 2001 UT App 224, ^[15-16 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(7) (1996)). 
Because attempted homicide is the only charge listed in the information or on which 
Joseph was bound over to district court, subsection (10) required that the case be 
transferred back to the juvenile court when Joseph was acquitted of that charge. 
The Court of Appeals alternatively dispensed with the state's claim that the district 
court retained jurisdiction because Joseph was convicted of a lesser included offense by 
pointing out that aggravated assault was not necessarily included in the charge of 
attempted homicide. Because the elements of aggravated assault were not necessarily 
included in the charge of attempted murder, aggravated assault could not be considered a 
charge under the Act. 
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Further, even if it is assumed that the information effectively charges 
lesser included offenses prior to the requested instructions on such 
offenses, the included offenses at that point can be only those "whose 
statutory elements are necessarily included within the statutory elements of 
the charge offense." State v. Carruth. 1999 UT 107, ^ fl3, 993 P.2d 869 
(emphasis added). The elements of aggravated assault are not necessarily 
included within the statutory elements of attempted murder. Compare Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-201 (1996) (listing elements of criminal homicide) with 
id. § 76-5-103 (listing elements of aggravated assault including elements of 
intentionally causing serious bodily injury to another or using a dangerous 
weapon or other means of force likely to produce death or serious bodily 
injury). Therefore, the information charging Tunzi with attempted murder 
did not include the charge of aggravated assault at the time of the bind-
over. 
Tunzi, 2001 UT App 224, ^|17. As the Court of Appeals recognized, aggravated assault 
could not be a "charge" under subsection (7) because it contains elements which are not 
contained in attempted homicide and therefore the juvenile court judge did not implicitly 
find probable cause to bind Joseph over on aggravated assault and the charge of 
aggravated assault was not contained in the information. 
A comparison of the elements of attempted homicide with the elements for the 
two forms of aggravated assault establishes that aggravated assault is not necessarily 
included in attempted homicide. See State v. Finlavson. 2000 UT 10, f l6, 994 P.2d 
1243 (statutory elements of a crime control whether a crime is an included offense). The 
elements of attempted murder, the crime for which Joseph was charged and bound over, 
are an attempt to knowingly or intentionally cause the death of another. R. 95; Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-20 l(l)(a) (1999). The elements of the two versions of aggravated 
assault submitted to the jury were a knowing or intentional assault which caused serious 
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bodily injury or was accomplished by the use of a dangerous weapon or other means of 
force likely to cause death or serious bodily injury. R. 96; Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 
(1999). Because an attempt to commit a homicide does not require causing serious 
bodily injury or using a dangerous weapon or the requisite force, the aggravated assault 
charges contain elements which are not necessarily included in the charge of attempted 
murder. The juvenile court's bindover on attempted murder therefore did not necessarily 
include a finding of probable cause to believe Joseph used a weapon or caused serious 
bodily injury.4 Aggravated assault could not therefore be a "charge" under subsection 
(10) because it does not qualify as a subsequent "charge" under subsection 7. 
The original legislative history and the purpose for which the Act was adopted 
also demonstrate that subsection (10) was intended to require that a case be remanded to 
4
 The district court improperly instructed the jury, at the state's request, on the 
assault charges. See State v. Carruth, 1999 UT 107,1ffil5-l8, 993 P.2d 869 (elements of 
lesser charge requested by the state must be completely contained in the charged 
offense); State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, 869 (Utah 1998) (same). In the context of 
a Serious Youth Offender case, where the state has succeeded in transferring a juvenile 
to district court based on the serious nature of the charges, allowing the state to proceed 
on lesser charges after the bindover raises questions as to the propriety of the transfer. 
Allowing the state leeway in requesting lesser instructions after a case is bound over 
solely on the more serious charge undercuts the purpose of the Act in that it allows the 
state to overcharge a case in juvenile court, then proceed in district court on the lesser 
charge which the evidence actually supports, thereby transferring cases to district court 
under the Act even though the crime was not one of the violent felonies listed in the Act. 
If this Court were to embrace the state's argument and preclude remand to the district 
court when defendants are convicted of lessers, prosecutors will be encouraged to 
overcharge their cases in order to establish an easy route to adult court in cases which do 
not otherwise qualify for district court treatment. 
17 
juvenile court when the juvenile is acquitted of the serious offense which provided the 
basis for transferring the case to district court. See. Tunzi, 2001 UT App 24, f 18 ("it 
would be unjust and contrary to a minor's best interest to require a minor to 'answer in 
district court in the same manner as an adult' when the minor has not been convicted of 
any of the violent felonies enumerated in the Serious Youth Offender Act1'). The 
legislative purpose for enacting the Act was to require that juveniles 16 and 17 years old 
who commit violent and aggressive offenses, making them as dangerous as adult 
criminals, be dealt with in the adult system. State in the interest of A.B., 936 P.2d at 
1098-99. The Legislature intended that violent and aggressive 16 and 17 year olds, most 
of whom would eventually end up in the adult system, be removed from the juvenile 
system when they commit one of the nine "very serious aggravated offenses" identified 
by the Legislature as being so violent and aggressive that transfer to the adult system is 
warranted. IcL; see also Utah House and Senate Floor Debates, 51st Legislature, General 
Session (February 9, 1995 and March 1, 1995) at 3, 11, 14, attached as Addendum D. 
The Legislature's focus in passing the Act was on holding hardened, seriously 
violent juvenile offenders accountable in the adult system. IdL at 3, 4, 14. The 
Legislature recognized that mechanisms existed in the adult system that should, in 
appropriate cases, keep youths who commit such serious offenses from going to prison or 
otherwise being treated too harshly in the adult system. IdL at 4. In addition, the 
Legislature included subsection (10) which mandated that the juvenile court regained 
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jurisdiction if the youth was acquitted of the charges or the charges were dismissed. 
When subsection (10) is read in light of the legislative purpose, it is evident that 
subsection (10) required that the case be remanded to the juvenile court when there was 
not a conviction for the serious, violent offense which was the basis for the transfer to 
adult court. 
Reading the Serious Youth Offender Act in harmony with the direct file and 
certification statutes further supports the Court of Appeals' holding that subsection (10) 
required remand to the juvenile court in this case. See. State in the interest of A.B., 936 
P.2d at 1097 (reading the Serious Youth Offender Act in harmony with the direct file and 
certification statutes). Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-601, the direct file statute, mandates that 
the district court has original jurisdiction over juveniles 16 and older when the juvenile is 
charged with murder or aggravated murder, or if the juvenile was previously committed 
to a secure facility. There is no provision in the direct file statute for remand to juvenile 
court if the juvenile is acquitted or the direct file charges are dismissed. The lack of 
language requiring remand to the juvenile court in the direct file statute, in contrast to the 
language of subsection (10) indicates that when a case is directly filed it stays in district 
court regardless of the outcome. By contrast, the inclusion language requiring remand in 
subsection (10) of the Act signals an intent to return a case to juvenile court when the 
basis for the transfer—commission of one of the nine violent crimes specified by the 
Legislature—is not proved. 
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The differences between the certification statute and the Serious Youth Offender 
Act likewise demonstrate that the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that subsection 
(10) required that the case be remanded. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-603 provides for 
certification of juveniles to district court when the juvenile judge finds that certification 
is appropriate based on one or more factors set forth in the statute. Utah Code Ann. § 78-
3a-603 contains a subsection with language almost identical to that of subsection (10) of 
the Act, which provides that the juvenile court regains jurisdiction "when there is an 
acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of the charges in the district court.11 Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-3a-603(14). The certification statute, however, contains an additional 
provision which states, f,[a] minor may be convicted under this section on the charges 
filed or on any other offenses arising out of the same criminal episode." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3a-603(13). The inclusion in the certification statute of language indicating that the 
case remains in district court even if the juvenile is convicted of an offense other than the 
offense charged demonstrates that the Legislature was capable of drafting language that 
would require a case to stay in district court even if the minor was not convicted of the 
charged offense, and would include such language if that were its intent. The inclusion 
of such language in the certification statute and by contrast, its absence in the Serious 
Youth Offender Act, demonstrates that the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the 
Act required remand when Joseph was acquitted of attempted homicide and convicted of 
a non-Serious Youth Offender offense. 
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The Legislature's choice of more expansive language in the certification statute 
furthers the purposes served by the certification statute. In deciding whether to certify a 
juvenile to district court, the juvenile court considers a number of factors, including the 
likelihood of rehabilitation. State in the interest of A.B.. 936 P.2d at 1098; Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-3a-603(3). The seriousness of the offense, while one of the factors to be 
considered in the certification context, does not have the overriding influence that it does 
in the Serious Youth Offender context. In fact, the juvenile court considers the nature of 
the juvenile at least as much as it does the nature of the crime when it decides to certify a 
case for district court treatment. After a juvenile court has considered the relevant 
factors and concluded that the juvenile should be certified, conviction on a lesser offense 
arising out of the same episode does not disturb the rationale for the original 
certification. By contrast, when a minor is charged with a Serious Youth Offender 
offense, the rationale for transferring the case to district court is destroyed when the 
minor is acquitted of the serious crime which provided the basis for the bindover or that 
charge is dismissed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(10) mandated that the juvenile court regained 
jurisdiction when a juvenile was acquitted of the serious offense which provided the 
basis for the transfer to district court. The Court of Appeals' holding was consistent with 
the plain language of the Act, the Act when it is read in its entirety, related statutes for 
prosecuting youthful offenders, and the purpose for which the Act was passed. In this 
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case, Joseph was charged only with attempted homicide and bound over to district court 
solely on that charge. R. 9, 11-12; see Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(l)(a)(ix). Joseph 
was acquitted of the charge which provided the basis for transfer to district court and 
convicted of a non-Serious Youth Offender charge. R. 109, 108. Accordingly, the Court 
of Appeals correctly concluded that the case should be remanded to the juvenile court. 
B. The State Has Not Offered Any Basis for Departing from Accepted 
Rules of Statutory Construction. 
Rather than analyzing the Act based on accepted rules of statutory construction, 
the state glosses over the language of the Act and instead asks this Court to overturn the 
Court of Appeals because (1) requiring remand creates an unworkable system which has 
been rejected by other states with different statutory schemes, and (2) the Legislature 
amended subsection (10) in response to the Court of Appeals' decision in this case, and 
that amendment and the comments made by legislators in amending the statute change 
the analysis of the original provision. Neither argument provides a persuasive basis for 
ignoring the language of the relevant version of the Act. 
(1) Remanding to the Juvenile Court When There Is an Acquittal or 
Dismissal of the Charges Which Provided the Basis for the Transfer Is a 
Fair and Practicable Procedure Which Is Mandated by the Language of 
the Act and Which Is Utilized by a Number of Jurisdictions. 
The Act explicitly outlines the cases which can be transferred to district court. It 
also contained explicit language in subsection (10) mandating that the juvenile court 
regained jurisdiction if there was an acquittal or a dismissal of the charges. The language 
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of the Act, not the decisions of other courts interpreting distinct statutory schemes or the 
state's concern that the approach is impractical, controls the determination of whether the 
Serious Youth Offender Act required that this case be remanded to juvenile court when 
Joseph was acquitted of attempted homicide and convicted of aggravated assault. 
Additionally, even if this Court were to consider the state's argument that the procedure 
affirmed by the Court of Appeals is unworkable and has been rejected by all other 
jurisdictions, such argument is incorrect. 
According to the state, requiring remand when there is an acquittal is unworkable 
because the district court would not be able to instruct on lesser offenses, and even if the 
district court did instruct on lessers, practical problems would arise as to when the case 
would be remanded and the juvenile court judge would be left to hear motions for a new 
trial and conduct sentencings in cases over which s/he did not preside. S.B. at 11-12. 
Neither of these concerns raised by the state withstands scrutiny. Moreover, based on 
convincing rationales, a number of states have embraced a similar procedure when a 
juvenile is acquitted of the charge which provided the basis for adult court jurisdiction 
and convicted of a lesser charge. 
(a) The District Court Is Not Precluded from Instructing on Lesser 
Offenses Where Appropriate. 
The state argues that a district court judge would not be able to give lesser offense 
instructions in Serious Youth Offender cases if the Court of Appeals' decision is upheld. 
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S.B. at 11. This argument fails because (1) it incorrectly assumes that lack of jurisdiction 
to sentence a juvenile or enter judgment of conviction on non-Serious Youth Offender 
charges means that the trial court also cannot instruct the jury or accept pleas on lesser 
offenses, and (2) it ignores the fact that due process requires a lesser included instruction 
must be given under certain circumstances when requested by the defendant. 
While section 78-3a-602(10) specified that the juvenile court regained jurisdiction 
if the juvenile was acquitted of the charges, it did not preclude the district court from 
giving an instruction on a lesser charge where appropriate. Subsection (10) required 
remand only after acquittal or dismissal of the charges; subsection (10) did not say that a 
trial court did not have the authority to fairly oversee the case by submitting a lesser 
offense instruction or accepting a plea to a lesser offense. In cases from other 
jurisdictions holding that the matter must be remanded to the juvenile court because the 
juvenile was acquitted of the offense which provided the basis for transfer to adult court 
or that charge was dismissed, the adult court nevertheless had jurisdiction to submit 
lesser included offense instructions or to accept a guilt plea to a lesser offense. See e.g. 
State v. Bedford, 190 So. 347, 350-51 (La. 1939) (judge can instruct on lesser offenses 
even though case will be transferred to juvenile court if minor is convicted of lesser); 
People v. Station. 156 Misc.2d 778, 780-81, 594 N.Y.S.2d 580, 582 (1992) (adult court 
can accept plea to lesser crime; case must then be transferred to juvenile court). 
The state bases its argument that the district court could not give instructions on 
24 
lesser offenses if the Court of Appeals' decision is upheld on State v. Morales . 694 A.2d 
758 (Conn. 1997) and People v. Murch. 263 N.Y. 285, 189 N.E. 220 (N.Y. 1934). S.B. 
at 11-12. Neither case provides guidance in interpreting Utah's statutory scheme not 
only because each case deals with different statutory language, but also because they are 
not well reasoned and reach incorrect conclusions. 
For example, in dictum in Morales, the Court assumed that if it were to hold that a 
juvenile charged in adult court with murder must be transferred to the juvenile court if 
convicted of manslaughter, it would also be required to depart from the "well established 
rules pertaining to lesser included offenses." Morales., 694 A.2d at 762. According to 
the Connecticut court, the jury could never deliberate on lessers because in that 
jurisdiction, the jury is always instructed "that it may not begin to deliberate regarding 
any lesser included offense until it has concluded that the defendant is not guilty of the 
greater offense." IcL (citation omitted). According to the court, if it were to hold that the 
case must be transferred to juvenile court if the juvenile is acquitted of the charged 
offense, it would lose jurisdiction the moment the jury found that the defendant was not 
guilty of the charge which provided the basis for the transfer. IcL 
Under Utah's statutory scheme, however, juries are not instructed that they must 
acquit before considering any lesser offenses. See_ State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 283-
85 (Utah 1989) (jury need not acquit defendant of greater offense before considering 
lesser) (citing People v. Mays, 288 N.W.2d 207, 208 (Mich. 1980) (instruction is 
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erroneous if it conveys the impression that the jury must acquit the defendant of the 
greater offense before considering the lesser)); see. also Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 869 
(citing State v. Powell. 872 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Utah 1994)). Because juries in Utah need 
not acquit a defendant of the greater offense before considering the lesser, the dictum in 
Morales does not apply. 
Additionally, the dictum in Morales is not persuasive since it disregards the due 
process requirement that juries must be instructed regarding appropriate lesser offenses. 
See Beck v.Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980); State v.Oldrovd. 685 P.2d 551, 555 (Utah 
1984). Regardless of whether the district court has jurisdiction to sentence a juvenile on 
a lesser charge, due process requires that the jury be instructed on lessers. Id. 
The decision in Murch, also relied on by the state for its assumption that the 
district court could not instruct the jury on a lesser offense if the Court of Appeals' 
decision is upheld, likewise does not provide persuasive guidance. In Murch , the court 
held that the trial judge properly refused to give a lesser offense instruction of 
manslaughter which was requested by the defendant. Murch . 263 N.Y. at 290. 
According to the court, the trial judge properly refused the lesser offense instruction 
because the adult court had jurisdiction over the fifteen year old defendant on only the 
charges of murder in the first or second degree. IdL. at 290. In concluding that the adult 
court need not give a lesser instruction on manslaughter, the Murch court rejected the 
defendant's argument that refusing the lesser instruction deprived him of a substantial 
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right. Id at 290. 
The reasoning of the court in Murch flies in the face of Beck. 447 U.S. 625 and 
Oldrovd, 685 P.2d at 555. Those cases, which were decided after Murch. recognize that 
due process requires that lesser included offense instructions be given in appropriate 
circumstances. Moreover, those decisions recognize that failure to give an appropriate 
lesser included offense instruction deprives a defendant of a substantial right. Contrary 
to Murch, the United States Supreme Court considers the refusal to give a lesser offense 
instruction the deprivation of a substantial right, and has held that a lesser instruction is 
required by due process because it provides "a less drastic alternative to the choice 
between conviction of the offense charged and acquittal." Beck. 447 U.S. at 633. 
Because the reasoning and holding in Murch was essentially overruled by Beck and 
Oldroyd, Murch is not persuasive and provides no guidance in analyzing Utah's statutory 
scheme. Contrary to the state's claim that the Court of Appeals' holding in this case 
precludes the district court from giving lesser included offense instructions in Serious 
Youth Offender cases, Utah's statutory scheme and due process allow and require such 
lesser instructions just as they do in any criminal case. 
(b) The Procedure Requiring Remand Is Workable, Fair and Simple. 
Despite the fact that the language of the Act required remand when a juvenile was 
acquitted of the charges, the state argues that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that 
remand was required in this case because such remand creates an unworkable procedure. 
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S.B. at 11-12. According to the state, the procedure embraced by the Court of Appeals 
raises a question as to when exactly the district court loses jurisdiction and requires the 
juvenile court to sentence juveniles and hear motions for new trial even though the 
juvenile judge did not try the case. The state complains that this procedure is "unwieldy" 
and therefore not intended by the Legislature. S.B. at 12-13. 
Contrary to the state's complaints, the procedure is workable and provides a fair 
and simple approach to be utilized when a juvenile is not convicted of the serious crime 
which provided the basis for the transfer to district court. When the jury returned an 
acquittal on the Serious Youth Offender charge or the district court judge accepted a plea 
to a lesser charge, the case was to be remanded. See. Tunzi, 2001 UT App 224, J^19. 
Remanding at that point was obvious and easily accomplished. Rather than setting a 
sentencing date, as judges ordinarily do when a verdict is returned or a defendant pleads 
guilty, the judge remanded to juvenile court. 
Having a juvenile judge sentence the minor or hear any motion for new trial 
likewise does not present any insurmountable barriers. A transcript of the trial will be 
available in most cases for the juvenile judge to review, making the juvenile court 
capable of assessing whether a motion for new trial should be granted and informing the 
judge of any details of the trial which might be relevant to sentencing. Moreover, 
disposition in juvenile court is different from sentencing in district court. A juvenile is 
not convicted of a crime and is instead adjudicated a delinquent; after the adjudication, 
28 
the juvenile court has the option of many different dispositions, as outlined in Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-3a-516 (1996). In choosing the appropriate disposition, the juvenile judge 
considers the bests interests of the minor as well as the interests of the public. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-3a-516(2)(t); 78-3a-102(5) (1996). This necessarily requires knowledge 
not only of the facts of the case at hand, but also complete knowledge regarding the 
juvenile's background, including the juvenile's family situation, prior involvement with 
the juvenile system, educational level, and any other factor about the juvenile's life 
which will aid the juvenile court in fashioning an appropriate disposition which is aimed 
at rehabilitating the juvenile. 
A judge's presence at the trial is a minor aspect, if indeed it is important at all, in 
assessing the appropriate disposition for a minor. Given the breadth of information 
considered by a juvenile judge in choosing a disposition, the fact that the juvenile judge 
was not present at the trial does not present an unworkable situation which should 
deprive the juvenile court of jurisdiction. Moreover, it makes little sense to deprive a 
juvenile who has not committed a serious offense of the benefits of the rehabilitative 
nature of the juvenile court simply because the juvenile judge did not preside at the trial; 
from a policy perspective, it is far more important for a juvenile who has not committed a 
serious offense to be dealt with appropriately by the juvenile system, and perhaps be 
rehabilitated, than it is for the judge who sentences the juvenile to have been present at 
trial. 
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In support of its argument that the Court of Appeals erred in remanding this case 
to the juvenile court, the state relies on footnotes in Judge Orme's concurrence. S.B. at 
12, citing Tunzi, 2001 UT App 224, ^|24, n.l, 2. The state ignores, however, the fact that 
despite his concerns, Judge Orme agreed with the majority in this case that subsection 
(10) required remand to the juvenile court when Joseph was acquitted of attempted 
homicide. Id at 1fl[21, 25 (Orme, J., concurring). As Judge Orme pointed out, the state's 
proposed interpretation of the Act would require a conclusion that subsection (10) is 
"meant to say nothing at all and was just wasting space in the Utah Code ...." Id. at ^ [25. 
In concluding that subsection (10) required that this case be remanded to the juvenile 
court, Judge Orme stated: 
One view-that offered by the State-is that subsection 10 merely 
recognizes that if a juvenile defendant is cleared of any and all charges in a 
proceeding that originated under the Serious Youth Offender Act, the 
juvenile justice system may go ahead and deal with unrelated matters 
involving the juvenile. The glaring difficulty with this interpretation is that 
this would be exactly the result if subsection 10 did not exist. In other 
words, under this interpretation subsection 10 merely states the obvious 
and is completely unnecessary. Courts are understandably reluctant to 
conclude that legislatures would enact into law provisions that do nothing 
at all. 
Id. at f^22 (emphasis added). After considering the state's proposed interpretation, Judge 
Orme rejected that approach because such interpretation would render subsection 10 
meaningless. Id at ^25. Given the fact that the certification and direct file statutes have 
a different approach along with the general notion that the legislature includes language 
for a reason, Judge Orme's conclusion that the state's interpretation fails because it 
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would render subsection 10 meaningless is correct. 
The state's incorrect claim that the Court of Appeals' decision in this case creates 
an unworkable procedure does not provide a basis for disregarding the language of the 
statute and rules of statutory interpretation. The language of the Act, rules of statutory 
interpretation, and the purposes served by the juvenile court all demonstrate that the 
Court of Appeals correctly held that this case must be remanded to the juvenile court. 
(c) Other States Require Remand When a Juvenile Is Acquitted or There Is 
a Dismissal of the Offense Which Provided the Basis for Adult Court 
Jurisdiction; Such a Procedure Ensures Fairness and Furthers the Purposes 
of the Juvenile Court Act. 
The state attempts to bolster its argument by claiming that all other states which 
have considered the issue have rejected the Utah statutory scheme which requires remand 
when a juvenile is convicted of an offense that does not fall within the district court 
jurisdiction. S.B. at 13. While the statutory schemes of other states provide no guidance 
in interpreting Utah's Serious Youth Offender Act, the state's claim that other states have 
rejected the Utah procedure also provides no support for the state because it is incorrect. 
A number of states require remand to the juvenile court when the juvenile is not 
convicted of the offense which provided the basis for the transfer. See e.g. Green v. 
Montgomery, 746 N.E.2d 1036, 1040 (N.Y. 2001) (recognizing that a case is remanded 
to juvenile court when a juvenile is acquitted of charge which provided the basis for 
adult court jurisdiction); Metcalf v. Commonwealth, 156 N.E.2d 649, 652-53 (Mass. 
1959) (recognizing that a juvenile, who was convicted of offense over which adult court 
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did not have jurisdiction, committed a delinquency and not a crime, and holding that case 
must be remanded to juvenile court even though adult court initially had jurisdiction 
based on the nature of the charges); State v. Torres. 538 A.2d 185, 192 (Conn. 1998) 
(holding that case is remanded to juvenile court for trial on lesser charge of manslaughter 
after state failed to establish probable cause on murder charge which had been filed 
directly in adult court); Bedford, 190 So. at 351 (holding that case is remanded to 
juvenile court when the juvenile is convicted of a lesser over which the adult court does 
not have jurisdiction); Statton., 594 N.Y.S.2d at 582-83 (holding that juvenile was not 
"legally responsible11 for lesser crime to which he pleaded guilty and case therefore must 
be remanded to juvenile court); see. also State v. Warden, 308 So. 2d 749 (La. 1975) 
(holding that district court did not have jurisdiction to accept guilty plea to lesser charge 
or to sentence juvenile, and remanding to juvenile court); State ex reL Johnson v. 
Blackburn, 384 So.2d 402, 403-04 (La. 1980) (same); State ex rel Stiegel v. Chapman , 
161 So. 424 (Fla. 1935) (ordering that case be remanded to juvenile court so that juvenile 
could be sentenced as a delinquent after juvenile was convicted of assault with intent to 
commit a felony); Murch, 189 N.E. at 21-22 (indicating that adult court would not have 
jurisdiction over lesser). In addition to case law, a number of statutes from other states 
have explicitly required that a case which has been transferred to adult court is to be 
remanded to the juvenile court when the juvenile is not convicted of the offense which 
provided the basis for the transfer. See e.g. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(j) (Michie 
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1999); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 19-2-518(l)(d)(IV) (West 1999); Ga. Code Ann. §15-11-
28(b)(2)(D) (2000); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 310.85 (McKinney 2002); Tenn. Code Ann. 
§37-l-134(c)(1998). 
One rationale for remanding a case to juvenile court when the juvenile is not 
convicted of an offense which provides for adult court jurisdiction is that the minor has 
not committed a crime, and has instead committed a delinquency which requires juvenile 
court supervision. See e ^ Green, 746 N.E.2d at 1039-40. The Metcalf court recognized 
that under Massachusetts' statutory scheme, a juvenile who commits certain offenses 
commits a crime and is subject to criminal court jurisdiction. Metcalf, 156 N.E.2d at 
652. When that juvenile is convicted of a lesser offense, however, the minor "was guilty 
of conduct which, in view of his age, constituted delinquency and not a crime.ff IdL at 
653. Because the juvenile committed a delinquency and not a crime, the criminal court 
could not impose a sentence and the case was remanded to the juvenile court. IdL; see 
also Statton, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 582 (interests of justice required that case be remanded to 
juvenile court when minor was convicted of lesser offense rather than offense which 
provided basis for transfer because juvenile was not "criminally responsible" for lesser 
offense under statutory scheme). The rationale that the juvenile has committed a 
delinquency rather than a crime is consistent with Utah's statutory scheme which 
provides that an offense committed by a juvenile is a delinquency unless the offense or 
circumstances allow for adult court jurisdiction. 
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Additionally, remanding a case to juvenile court when the juvenile is convicted of 
a lesser offense rather than the offense which provided the basis for the transfer furthers 
the policies underlying the juvenile system. See Torres, 538 A.2d at 192. Utah's 
statutory scheme evidences an intent that offenses committed by juveniles be treated as 
delinquencies within the juvenile system unless the crime fits within the direct or Serious 
Youth Offender statutes, or the juvenile requires certification. The protections afforded 
juveniles in the juvenile system and the focus on treatment and rehabilitation pertain to 
lesser offenses which do not qualify for Serious Youth Offender treatment. As the Court 
of Appeals recognized, "it would be contrary to the purposes of the Juvenile Court Act of 
1996 to interpret the term 'charges' in subsection 10 to include charges other than those 
requiring bind-over under the Serious Youth Offender Act." Tunzi, 2001 UT App 224, 
*|fl8. The Court of Appeals' holding that a case must be remanded to the juvenile court 
when the minor is acquitted of the charge which provided the basis for district court 
jurisdiction furthers the policies of the juvenile system by treating the lesser crimes as 
delinquencies for which the juvenile is not criminally responsible rather than as crimes 
which require adult punishment. 
Fairness also requires that a case be remanded to the juvenile court when the 
juvenile is acquitted of the charge which provided the basis for the transfer. See State v. 
BeW, 564 N.W.2d 560, 571 (Minn. 1997) (Keith, C.J., dissenting). Remand ensures that 
juveniles who committed the same crime are subjected to the same potential punishment, 
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and prevents the unfairness of subjecting a juvenile who was charged with a more 
serious crime, but acquitted of that crime, from being subjected to the harsher penalties 
of the adult system simply because an information was filed. The dissent in Behl 
recognized the unfairness of subjecting a juvenile to adult punishments even though the 
juvenile was acquitted of the crime which transferred the case to adult court when other 
juveniles who commit the same lesser offense receive the benefits of the juvenile system. 
Id. (Keith, C.J., dissenting). 
The weakness of the majority's rationale would not be so troubling if the 
results seemed fair to juveniles [who are acquitted of the crime which 
provided the basis for the transfer.] [footnote omitted]. But the 
unavoidable consequence of the court's reasoning is that a child who is 
indicted but acquitted of the enumerated offense (first-degree murder) 
faces the harsher sentencing regime that the legislature crafted for adult 
perpetrators, while a child who is fortunate enough not to be indicted for 
first-degree murder in the first place is sentenced according to the juvenile 
court rules. ... The statute does not say that certain juveniles should be 
treated "much more harshly," [citation omitted] simply because they have 
been indicted, and despite exoneration by a jury. To do so, it seems, is to 
punish the juvenile for a crime he or she did not commit. 
Id. (Keith, C.J., dissenting). 
Finally, the Court of Appeals' holding that a Serious Youth Offender case must be 
remanded to juvenile court when the minor is acquitted of the charge which provided the 
basis for district court jurisdiction is consistent with the rule of lenity. See State v. 
Egbert, 748 P.2d 558, 562 n. 3 (Utah 1987) (Durham, J., dissenting); State v. Tapp . 490 
P.2d 334, 336 (Utah 1971). "It is well established that ambiguities in criminal statutes 
must be resolved in favor of lenity." Egbert, 748 P.2d at 562 n. 3. One of the "time 
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honored rules of the criminal law" is that if there is an ambiguity as to the severity of the 
punishment, the more lenient alternative applies. Tapp, 490 P.2d at 336. Given the 
significant increase in the severity of treatment in the adult system and the critical 
importance of the question as to whether a juvenile case should be given adult court 
treatment (State v. Russell. 791 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 1990) (quoting State in re 
Clatterbuck. 700 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 1985)), the rule of lenity requires that any 
ambiguity as to whether the case must be remanded be resolved in favor of remand. 
Contrary to the state's claims, other states require that a case be remanded to the 
juvenile court when a juvenile is acquitted of the charge which provided the basis for 
adult court jurisdiction or that charge is dismissed. Remanding to the juvenile court 
under such circumstances furthers the purposes of the juvenile court and ensures fairness 
in the prosecution of juveniles. 
(2) The Legislative Amendment to Subsection (10), Which Went Into Effect 
After the State Filed Its Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Does Not Change 
the Interpretation of the Version Subsection (10) Applicable to this Case. 
The state claims that a recent amendment to the Serious Youth Offender Act, 
made well after final judgment in Joseph's case, applies to this case and overrules the 
Court of Appeals' decision. S.B. at 14-20. Despite the fact that this amendment was 
made after the Court of Appeals issued its opinion and apparently in response to that 
opinion, the state asks this Court to consider the language of the amendment as 
controlling this issue. Id. Such an approach is unwarranted and unacceptable since the 
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amendment substantively changes the nature of the penalty applicable to this case and 
significantly increases punishment retroactively. 
The amendment, which was passed and went into effect after this Court had 
granted the state's petition for writ of certiorari changes the Act by stating that if the 
defendant is convicted of a lesser offense, the district court retains jurisdiction. 
(10) If a minor enters a plea to, or is found guilty of, any of the charges 
filed or any other offense arising from the same criminal episode, the 
district court retains jurisdiction over the minor for all purposes, including 
sentencing. 
(11) The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of Youth 
Corrections regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over 
the juvenile when there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal 
of all charges in the district court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(10) & (11) (as amended by S.B. 26, 54th Leg. (2002). 
Despite the fact that the amendment significantly increases punishment and 
dramatically changes the nature of the adjudication from a delinquency to a conviction, 
the state claims that the amendment is remedial and procedural and therefore applies to 
Joseph, whose case should have been remanded to the juvenile court three years ago 
when he was acquitted of attempted homicide. Applying the recent amendment to this 
case would violate Utah Code Ann, § 68-3-3 (2002) and the state and federal protections 
against ex post facto laws. It would be fundamentally unfair to apply a legislative 
amendment aimed directly at this case to increase the appropriate disposition from a 
juvenile adjudication of delinquency to a criminal conviction carrying a prison sentence 
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of five years to life. 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 mandates that a statutory amendment should not be 
applied retroactively unless the amendment explicitly states that it is to be applied 
retroactively. Id. The statute states, M[n]o part of these revised statutes is retroactive, 
unless expressly so declared." Id. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 embodies the "long-
standing rule of statutory construction" that courts "do not apply retroactively legislative 
enactments that alter substantive law or affect vested rights unless the legislature has 
clearly expressed that intention." Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 257, 261 
(Utah 1998) (citations omitted). 
An exception to the general rule against retroactivity does exist when the changes 
are procedural only. Olsen, 956 P.2d at 261. This exception is "narrowly drawn," 
however, and applies only to ""the practice and procedure or the legal machinery by 
which the substantive law is determined or made effective.'" IdL. (citation omitted). If 
the amendment destroys, eliminates or enlarges vested or contract rights, it is substantive 
in nature and cannot be applied retroactively. IdL. 
The amendment to subsection (10) was substantive in nature and therefore cannot 
be applied retroactively to this case. "'"Substantive law is defined as the positive law 
which creates, defines and regulates the rights of the parties which may give rise to a 
cause of action ... ."'" Brown & Root Indust. Serv. v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 947 P.2d 
671, 675 (Utah 1997) (further citations omitted). This Court has held that substantive 
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changes preclude retroactive application in a variety of cases, including: (1) amendment 
to notice requirements which alter rights to workers' compensation (01sen_, 956 P.2d at 
261); (2) change to statute of limitations which would revive a cause of action if applied 
retroactively (Roark v. Crabtree. 893 P.2d 1058, 1062 (Utah 1995)); (3) changes which 
eliminate workers' compensation claims (Brown & Root Indus. Serv., 947 P.2d at 676); 
and (4) a change which prohibited contingent fee arrangements where such arrangements 
were legal at the time the agreement was entered into (Cache County v. Property Tax 
Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 922 P.2d 758, 766 (Utah 1996)). 
Assuming the amendment to subsection (10) requires that the district court retain 
jurisdiction in any future Serious Youth Offender case when the juvenile is acquitted of 
the serious offense but convicted of a lesser offense, that change is substantive in nature 
and directly impacts on the rights of the parties. At the time of the original judgment in 
this case, the Act required that the juvenile court regained jurisdiction because Joseph 
was acquitted of the Serious Youth Offender offense and convicted of a charge which 
did not qualify for district court jurisdiction. See. Tunzi, 2001 UT App 224, ^fl9. 
Because the juvenile court had jurisdiction, the matter was a civil delinquency rather than 
a criminal conviction. As this Court has recognized, "there are critically important 
differences in the treatment of those juveniles tried as adults compared to those left in the 
juvenile system." State v. MohL 901 P.2d 991, 998 (Utah 1995). This Court recognized 
the significantly more lenient treatment which occurs when a juvenile is adjudicated as a 
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delinquent: 
For instance, cases tried in the juvenile court are considered civil rather 
than criminal proceedings. Utah Code Ann.§ 78-3a-44(l). This has 
significant ramifications for an individual's future criminal record. 
Moreover, any juvenile committed to a secure facility under the direction of 
the Division of Youth Corrections must be released at age twenty-one. 
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7-108(1). 
Id 
This Court acknowledged the "dramatic contrast" between the significantly 
harsher penalties and consequences that a juvenile faces when he is convicted in district 
court and the consequences a juvenile faces in juvenile court: 
Aside from acquiring a permanent criminal record, this juvenile [facing 
charges in district court] faces a potential life sentence or, in the case of a 
capital felony, death, obviously a much greater deprivation of personal 
liberty than is risked by his or her counterpart who is tried as a juvenile. 
Moreover, rather than facing detention at a juvenile facility, these offenders 
are eligible for housing in the state prison or other adult facilities, [citations 
omitted.] 
Id. In fact, the significantly harsher treatment in the adult system resulted in unequal 
treatment for juveniles whose cases were directly filed. Id. The recognition in Mohi that 
juveniles face significantly harsher penalties and consequences in the adult system than 
they do in the juvenile system demonstrates that the amendment is substantive in nature. 
Comparing this amendment to other changes which this Court has concluded are 
substantive further demonstrates the substantive nature of this amendment. Just as a 
change which eliminates recovery of a workers' compensation claim is substantive, this 
amendment which precludes a juvenile from receiving the benefits and lesser 
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consequences of the juvenile system is substantive. Likewise, just as a change in the 
statute of limitations which would revive a cause of action cannot be retroactively 
applied because one of the parties would suffer more severe consequences than existed 
under the statute of limitations which had been exhausted, the amendment in this case 
cannot be retroactively applied because it creates an adult court conviction where one did 
not previously exist. 
The state claims that despite the fact that the Legislature did not expressly state 
that this amendment was to be applied retroactively, the amendment nevertheless applies 
retroactively to this case because the amendment was procedural in nature and merely a 
"clarification or amplification as to how the law should have been understood prior to its 
enactment." S.B. at 16, quoting Foil v. Ballinger. 601 P.2d 144, 151 (Utah 1979) 
(quoting Okland Constr. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n. 520 P.2d 208, 210-11 (Utah 1974)). 
The state's claim fails, however, because the amendment is neither procedural in nature 
nor merely a clarification of the Act prior to the amendment. 
First, as set forth supra, the amendment is not procedural in nature and instead 
affects a juvenile's substantive rights by significantly increasing the penalties and 
consequences faced by a juvenile who is convicted of a non-Serious Youth Offender 
offense in district court. The state claims that the amendment does not affect any vested 
rights because a juvenile does not have the right to treatment in the juvenile system. S.B. 
at 20. While a juvenile may not have a constitutional right to treatment in the juvenile 
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system, under the Act prior to the recent amendment, juveniles had a right to have their 
cases remanded to the juvenile court when they were acquitted of the offense which 
provided the basis for the bindover. In other words, prior to the amendment, Joseph had 
a vested right to have his case returned to the juvenile court pursuant to subsection (10) 
of the Act. See Tunzi, 2001 UT App 224, ^19. Because the Act mandated that the case 
be remanded, Joseph's substantial rights were affected by the amendment regardless of 
whether he had a constitutional right to have the juvenile court hear his case. The state 
confuses statutory rights with constitutional rights when it makes this argument and is 
incorrect in asserting that Joseph's rights were not affected by the amendment. 
Because the amendment affects Joseph's substantive rights, it does more than 
merely affect"'the judicial machinery available for determining the substantive rights of 
a juvenile'" (S.B. at 20 (quoting Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n. 953 P. 2d 435, 438 (Utah 1998))). In Evans & Sutherland . this Court 
considered an amendment which changed the procedure for review of a Utah State Tax 
Commission decision. 953 P.2d at 435. Prior to the amendment, a tax commission 
decision could be reviewed only pursuant to a petition for review filed in this Court; the 
amendment allowed review either by this Court pursuant to such a petition or a de novo 
review in the district court. This Court held that the amendment changing the procedure 
available for review did not affect the substantive rights of the parties and instead was a 
procedural change which could be applied retroactively. IdL. at 438. Because the 
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amendment "controlled] the mode and form of procedure for enforcing the underlying 
substantive rights in the valuation dispute between the Board and Evans & Sutherland" 
and "[t]he substantive law pertinent to this dispute had not changed," this Court held that 
the amendment was procedural in nature. Id. 
By contrast, the amendment in this case does not merely change the procedure for 
enforcing the rights of the parties. Instead, it changes the nature of the proceeding from 
civil to criminal and the nature of the judgment from a delinquency adjudication to a 
criminal conviction. The amendment does not merely change the court in which a party 
can pursue an appeal in a civil matter, as was the case in Evans & Sutherland. Instead, 
the amendment significantly changes the penalties and consequences for a juvenile 
offender, subjects the juvenile to the possibility of adult incarceration, imposes an adult 
criminal record on the juvenile, and otherwise impacts substantively on the nature of the 
case. Accordingly, Evans & Sutherland does not support the state's argument that this 
change is merely procedural in nature. 
Nor does State v. Daniels. 2002 UT 2, f t l , 40 P.3d 611 support the state's claim 
that this amendment is procedural in nature. In Daniels, this Court held that an 
amendment which changed the number of jurors necessary to impose life without parole 
in a capital case from twelve to ten was procedural in nature. IdL_ This Court concluded 
in Daniels that the amendment was procedural because "[it] has nothing to do with the 
substance of defendant's crime or the amount of punishment specified for it; it deals with 
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the procedure by which the jury arrives at a decision on the amount of punishment to 
impose from sentencing alternatives." IdL. 
In contrast to Daniels, the amendment in this case affects both the substance of 
Joseph's offense and the amount and nature of punishment which can be imposed. To 
the extent the amendment requires that the case remain in district court despite the 
acquittal on the offense which provided the basis for the bindover, the substance of the 
conviction for the lesser offense is changed from a civil delinquency to a criminal 
conviction. Moreover, as this Court recognized in Mohi, 901 P.2d at 998, the nature of 
the punishment is increased dramatically when a conviction is entered in adult court 
rather than an adjudication in juvenile court. The amendment is therefore procedural in 
nature and cannot be applied retroactively because it deprives Joseph of his rights and 
imposes greater liability on him. See Foil,601 P.2d at 151 (quoting Okland Constr. Co. 
v. Indus. Comm'n. 520 P.2d 208, 210, 211 (Utah 1974). 
Relying on Foil and Okland Constr. Co., the state also argues that the amendment 
can be imposed retroactively because it merely clarifies the original statute. S.B. at 17-20. 
A review of those cases establishes, however, that an amendment which is substantive 
in nature cannot be considered merely a clarification. 
In Foil, this Court considered the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act of 1976 and 
an amendment to that Act which was passed in 1979. Foil. 601 P.2d at 149-52. The Act 
itself included a requirement that the plaintiff serve a notice of intent to sue on the 
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defendant. Id The 1979 amendment explicitly stated that the notice requirement was 
not to be applied retroactively. IcL This Court held that the 1979 amendment was not 
substantive in nature because it did not deprive a party of any rights or impose greater 
liability on a party. Id. at 151. Rather than affecting substantive rights, the amendment 
merely clarified that the Legislature had not intended the notice requirement to be 
retroactive when it passed the Act. IdL. 
In concluding that the amendment was just a clarification in Foil, this Court 
recognized the potential unfairness and mischief of allowing the Legislature to control 
the outcome of a case by passing a law after the fact to accomplish that purpose. 
We recognize the potential mischief, indeed, the grave constitutional 
problems, that could arise if the Legislature were to attempt to determine 
the outcome of a particular case by passage of a law intended to accomplish 
such a purpose. There is, however, no such difficulty here. The 
Legislature in this case has merely acted to effectuate its original intent 
with respect to the notice of intent to sue provision. 
IdL at 151. If the state's argument that this substantive change is merely a clarification 
and can be retroactively applied were embraced, the Legislature could carry out 
significant "mischief by overriding appellate court decisions by simply having a member 
of the Legislature state that the amendment is a clarification rather than a change. 
While the amendment in Foil did not deprive a party of rights or impose greater 
liability and instead merely clarified that the procedural requirement of serving a notice 
of intent to sue did not apply retroactively, the amendment in this case does impose 
greater liability because it changes the substantive meaning of the statute. Rather than 
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simply clarifying that a required procedural prerequisite does not apply retroactively, this 
amendment changes the nature of the offense and the punishment for juveniles who are 
bound over under the Serious Youth Offender Act, but convicted of a lesser offense. 
Additionally, in Foil, the Legislature as a whole passed an amendment which 
explicitly stated that the notice requirement was not to be applied to causes of action 
which arose prior to the 1976 Act. 601 P.2d at 150. By contrast, the amendment to the 
Serious Youth Offender Act does not explicitly address the retroactive application of that 
amendment. Had the Legislature intended to merely clarify its prior intent, explicit 
language to that effect could have been included in the amendment. The fact that explicit 
language regarding the retroactive application of the amendment was not included works 
against retroactive application of the amendment, particularly in light of the fact that the 
Legislature was aware of the Court of Appeals' decision in this case. 
Along the same lines, the remarks of a single senator do not clearly indicate that 
the amendment was merely a clarification and do not speak for the entire Legislature. As 
the state recognizes, f'[f]loor debates, including statements by a bill's sponsor, are at best 
an uncertain guide to statutory construction." S.B. at 17 (citations omitted). While the 
isolated remarks may give some sense of what a single senator thought the amendment 
might accomplish, they fail to establish that the amendment was merely a clarification of 
the Legislature's intent several years before when it passed the Act. 
The remarks of a sole senator and representative also fail to establish that the 
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amendment was merely a clarification because the remarks themselves seem to confuse 
the impact and functioning of the Serious Youth Offender Act. Despite the fact that the 
amendment would require juveniles to be bound over to district court and remain there 
even if they have no juvenile history and even if they are not in fact convicted of the 
violent offense which provided the basis for the transfer, the amendment's sponsor 
continues to indicate that the Act and amendment are aimed only at teenagers who have 
committed violent, out of control crimes and who have exhausted the resources of the 
juvenile court. 
I don't know how much background I want to give you on the 
Serious Youth Offender. I won't give you a lot but I think you need to 
know why we're doing what we're doing. The Serious Youth Offender 
was an action we took several years ago with a deep concern about some of 
the youths who were 16 and 17 years old who would normally be so out of 
control that the juvenile system would have no impact whatsoever. We had 
to have a mechanism whereby we could move them into the adult system 
where the emphasis is more on safety and less on rehabilitation because of 
the limited dollars we have in the juvenile court system in which the 
primary emphasis is on rehabilitation. 
Recording of the Proceedings of the 2002 General Session, presentation of S.B. 26 to the 
Utah State Senate, Jan. 22, 2002, Day 2, Tape 4, Tr. at 1 (emphasis added); see 
Addendum E. Later, in explaining the impact of the proposed amendment, Senator 
Hilly ard again emphasized that the Serious Youth Offender Act was aimed at transferring 
juveniles who committed serious, violent felonies into the adult system. 
We made the decision when we did the Serious Youth Offender that / / 
someone does something that serious, they 've had that kind of background 
and that kind of help, the decision we made is that the rehabilitative thrust 
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of juvenile court should no longer be available to them. They ought to 
move into the adult system with the emphasis on public safety. So what the 
bill says is, if that happens again, because we've made the decision to move 
them over to the adult system, they'll stay in the adult system and be treated 
for the conviction of the misdemeanor as though they had been an adult 
and convicted of the same misdemeanor and treated there. 
Id. at 2 (emphasis added). This continued focus by the Act's sponsor on transferring 
violent juveniles who had committed a serious crime and who were not amenable to 
rehabilitation in the juvenile system demonstrates that the Act was aimed at giving adult 
consequences only to those youth who commit serious violent felonies. Indeed, the 
amendment's sponsor suggests that pursuant to the amendment, juveniles will stay in 
district court even if they are convicted of a lesser offense because they have "expended 
[the juvenile system's] patience, programs and time " Recording of the Proceedings 
of the 2002 General Session, presentation of S.B. 26 to the Utah State Senate, Jan. 23, 
2002, Tape 5, Tr. at 1. These remarks indicating that the Act and the amendment are 
aimed at transferring juveniles who commit violent crimes and who have exhausted the 
resources of the juvenile system support the notion that the Act as originally passed 
required that a case be remanded to the juvenile court if the minor was not convicted of 
the felony which provided the basis for the transfer.5 
5
 The continued emphasis on transferring teens who have committed violent 
felonies and who have exhausted the resources of the juvenile system also suggests that 
the amendment's sponsor did not fully appreciate the impact of amending the Act with 
the current subsection (10). To the extent the amendment requires that a case remain in 
district court even if the juvenile is not convicted of a serious offense, a juvenile who has 
no delinquency history and who is overcharged and bound over on an aggravated 
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Additionally, applying the recent amendment retroactively violates the prohibition 
against ex post facto laws found in Utah Const. Art. I, § 18 and U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10, 
cl. I.6 This Court has defined ex post facto laws as laws which increase the punishment 
for a crime after the crime is done or which make something a crime which was not a 
crime when done. 
An ex post facto law is one that punishes as a crime an act previously 
committed, which was innocent when done; one that makes more 
burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which 
deprives one charged with a crime of any defense available according to 
law at the time when the act was committed. 
Daniels, 2002 UT 2, TJ43 (citing State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 585 (Utah 1983)) (further 
citations omitted). As previously outlined, the amendment to subsection (10) increases 
punishment by changing the nature of the adjudication from a civil delinquency to an 
adult felony conviction. It punishes as a crime any lesser offense even though prior to 
the amendment, the lesser offense was merely a delinquency. Accordingly, the 
application of the recent amendment to this case violates the ex post facto prohibitions 
found in the state and federal constitutions. 
robbery would be subject to adult consequences even though the evidence ultimately 
established that the offense was merely a class B misdemeanor theft. Rather than 
focusing on rehabilitation of the juvenile under these circumstances, the Act would 
require imposition of adult consequences. Although the juvenile did not have "that kind 
of background" and had not had "that kind of help," the juvenile would nevertheless not 
receive rehabilitative benefits of the juvenile system. 
6
 This Court has interpreted the ex post facto clause found in Article I, section 18 
of the Utah Constitution consistently with the federal ex post facto protection. Daniels , 
2002 UT 2,1J42. 
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CONCLUSION 
The version of the Serious Youth Offender Act in effect up until earlier this year 
required that this case be remanded to juvenile court when Joseph was acquitted of the 
serious offense which provided the basis for the transfer to district court. The Court of 
Appeals correctly concluded that the trial court erred when it failed to remand the case to 
juvenile court. Respondent/Defendant Joseph Tunzi respectfully requests that this Court 
affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and order that his case be remanded to the 
juvenile court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this S± . day of June, 2002. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
JOHN O'CONNELL, JR. 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
50 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered the original 
and nine copies of the foregoing to the Utah Supreme Court, 450 South State Street, 
5th Floor, P. O. Box 140210, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0210, and four copies to the 
Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, 
P. O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this S& day of June, 2002. 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED to the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Attorney General's Office 




This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
— 0 0 O 0 0 — 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v 
Joseph Tunzi, 
Defendant and Appellant 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No 20000728-CA 
F I L E D 
July 19, 2001 
ll 2001 UTAPP224HI 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable Judith S Atherton 
Attorneys 
Joan C Watt and John D O'Connell, Jr, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Mark L Shurtleff and J Frederic Voros, Jr, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Orme 
DAVIS, Judge 
1]1 Joseph Tunzi challenges the district court's jurisdiction to enter a judgment of conviction for aggravated 
assault, a third degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 76-5-103(1 )(b) (1999) We vacate the district court's 
judgment of conviction and remand to the district court with instructions to transfer the case to juvenile court for 
entry of an adjudication of guilt for third degree felony aggravated assault 
BACKGROUND 
fl2 In the fall of 1998, when Tunzi was seventeen years old, he got into a fight with another young man The State 
filed an information in juvenile court charging Tunzi with attempted murder After a hearing held pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann § 78-3a-602 (1996) (Serious Youth Offender Act), the juvenile court bound Tunzi over to district court 
to be tried as an adult 
P Following a two day jury trial, the court instructed the jury on the elements of attempted murder and the lesser 
included offense of aggravated assault. The aggravated assault instruction included elements of both the second 
and third degree felony versions of that crime. After deliberating, the jury found Tunzi not guilty of attempted 
murder and guilty of aggravated assault.1 ] However, because the aggravated assault instruction contained 
elements of both the second and third degree felony versions of aggravated assault, Tunzi moved for a new trial 
or, in the alternative, entry of a conviction for aggravated assault as a third degree felony. The State conceded 
that the appropriate remedy for the equivocal instruction and general verdict was conviction for aggravated 
assault as a third degree felony. 
114 After the State conceded that Tunzi should be convicted for aggravated assault as a third degree felony, Tunzi 
moved the court to remand his case to the juvenile court. Tunzi argued that the district court would lose 
jurisdiction if he was found guilty of third degree felony aggravated assault because that offense is not one of the 
serious youth offender offenses enumerated in section 78-3a-602(1) allowing bind-over. The district court denied 
Tunzi's motion to remand the case to juvenile court and entered a judgment of conviction for the third degree 
felony version of aggravated assault. The court then sentenced Tunzi to serve an indeterminate term of zero to 
five years in the Utah State Prison.1^ 
1J5 Tunzi appealed his conviction arguing that the district court erred when it refused to remand his case to 
juvenile court. Tunzi also argued there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for aggravated assault. 
After filing his notice of appeal, Tunzi discovered that the videotape and transcript from one day of his trial were 
missing. Tunzi then moved for summary reversal, and the State conceded that reversal was appropriate. The 
court of appeals denied Tunzi's motion and remanded the case to the trial court to reconstruct the record pursuant 
to Rule 11(g) of Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Tunzi appealed the court of appeals decision to the Utah 
Supreme Court. On certiorari, the supreme court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial 
court for a new trial. See State v. Tunzi, 2000 UT 38, 998 P.2d 816. The supreme court held that reconstruction of 
the record was inappropriate because "[t]he burdens and futility associated with reconstructing a record are 
increased exponentially when the issue on appeal concerns the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a 
conviction . . . ." [d, at 1J3. Neither the court of appeals nor the supreme court addressed the merits of Tunzi's first 
appeal. 
116 On remand, the State moved to proceed under the original information charging Tunzi with attempted murder. 
— However, pursuant to plea negotiations, the State amended the original information to charge Tunzi with the 
third degree felony version of aggravated assault. Tunzi pleaded guilty to this charge; however, he did not renew 
his motion to remand his case to juvenile court. In accordance with the plea agreement, the district court again 
sentenced Tunzi to zero to five years in the Utah State Prison. However, the court gave Tunzi credit for the 
twenty-one months he had already served and suspended the remainder of the sentence. Tunzi appeals the 
district court's judgment of conviction. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
117 Whether the Serious Youth Offender Act required the district court to remand Tunzi's case to the juvenile court 
involves a question of statutory construction which "we review for correctness and give no deference to the 
conclusions of the trial court." Adkinsv. Uncle Bart's, Inc., 2000 UT 14,1111, 1 P.3d 528. 
ANALYSIS 
H8 Tunzi asserts, pursuant to the Serious Youth Offender Act, the district court lost jurisdiction and was required 
to remand the case to juvenile court when the jury acquitted him of the attempted murder charge and found him 
guilty of what was ultimately determined to be third degree felony aggravated assault. 
H9 The Serious Youth Offender Act provides the procedure by which a juvenile may be "bound over and held to 
answer in the district court in the same manner as an adult. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(3)(b) (1996). One 
of the prerequisites for binding a minor over to district court is that the minor be charged with one of the 
specifically enumerated offenses listed in the Serious Youth Offender Act. See id. § 78-3a-602(1)(a) (listing 
attempted murder and second degree felony aggravated assault as charges warranting bind-over).1^ However, 
the Serious Youth Offender Act also provides: "The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of 
Youth Corrections regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the juvenile when there is an 
acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of the charges in the district court."'^IdL § 78-3a-602(10). . 
1J10 As the above language clearly indicates, the Serious Youth Offender Act defines the jurisdictional parameters 
of both the juvenile court and the district court in those instances when a minor is charged with one of the 
offenses listed in section 78-3a-602(1)(a) Therefore, the Serious Youth Offender Act provides the district court 
with subject matter jurisdiction over minors bound over to that court See Frankha Covey Client Sales v Melvin, 
2000 UT App 110.1J24 n 3, 2 P 3d 451 ("Subject matter jurisdiction is the authority and competency of the court to 
decide the case ") Consequently, any jurisdictional defect arising from misapplication of the statute cannot be 
waived See James v Galetka, 965 P 2d 567, 570 (Utah Ct App 1998) (stating subject matter jurisdiction '"can 
neither be waived nor conferred by consent of the accused'" (citation omitted)), In re E G T , 808 P 2d 138, 139 
(Utah Ct App 1991) (stating, "a [subject matter] jurisdictional defect cannot be waived") 
1J11 Here, the State argues that Tunzi waived his right to appeal when he pleaded guilty to third degree felony 
aggravated assault Seejd at 140 (stating that "entry of an unconditional guilty plea constituted a waiver of the 
claimed defects in the juvenile court certification proceedings") However, as stated above, the Serious Youth 
Offender Act confers subject matter jurisdiction on the district court Therefore, Tunzi did not waive his claim of 
error when he pleaded guilty to the charge of third degree felony aggravated assault Consequently, we address 
the merits of Tunzi's appeal 
1J12 The State charged Tunzi with attempted murder, and the juvenile court bound Tunzi over to district court 
pursuant to the Serious Youth Offender Act Tunzi was then tried in district court where a jury acquitted him of 
attempted murder Consequently, Tunzi was acquitted of the original charge that supported the juvenile court's 
bind-over to district court Further, Tunzi was found guilty of the lesser included offense of aggravated assault, 
and due to the ambiguous jury verdict, the court in effect dismissed the charge of second degree felony 
aggravated assault ^ 
1J13 The State argues that the juvenile court did not regain jurisdiction over Tunzi because Tunzi was not 
acquitted of second degree felony aggravated assault-an offense allowing bind-over under the Serious Youth 
Offender Act However, the State ignores the language of the Serious Youth Offender Act which states that the 
juvenile court regains jurisdiction if "there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of the charges in the 
district court" Id § 78-3a-602(10) (emphasis added) Upon the finding of not guilty of attempted murder and the 
court's decision to grant Tunzi's motion to enter a conviction of third degree felony aggravated assault, the 
juvenile court regained jurisdiction over Tunzi because there was "a finding of not guilty [and] dismissal of the 
charges [enumerated in section 78-3a-602(1) and allowing bind-over to] district court" Utah Code Ann § 78-3a-
602(10) (1996) Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred when it denied Tunzi's motion to transfer 
jurisdiction back to the juvenile court prior to entry of his conviction 
1J14 Finally, the State argues that the district court retained jurisdiction over Tunzi because Tunzi was convicted of 
an offense arising out of the same criminal episode In support of its argument, the State points to subsection 7 of 
the Serious Youth Offender Act See Utah Code Ann § 78-3a-602(7) (1996) Subsection 7 provides 
When ajjefendant isj:harged with multiple criminal offenses in the same information or indictment 
and is bound over to answer in the district court for one or more charges under this section, other 
offenses arising from the same criminal episode and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies 
charged against him shall be considered together with those charges, and where the court finds 
probable cause to believe that those crimes have been committed and that the defendant committed 
them, the defendant shall also be bound over to the district court to answer for those charges 
Id (emphasis added) The State reasons that the use of the term "charges" in subsection 10 includes the serious 
youth offender charge(s) as well as any other charge arising out of the same criminal episode ld_ at § 78-3a-602 
(10) Consequently, the State concludes that there must be an acquittal, finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all 
offenses charged for the juvenile court to regain jurisdiction under subsection 10 See id 
IP 5 While subsection 7 allows the district court to exercise jurisdiction over other offenses arising out of (and 
after) the violent felony enumerated in section 78-3a-602(1) and allowing bind-over, the plain language of 
subsection 7 requires that these offenses be charged in the same information Seejd In addition, subsection 7 
requires the juvenile court to "find[] probable cause to believe that those crimes have been committed and that the 
defendant committed them " ld__ at § 78-3a-602 (7) 
1J16 Here, the State charged Tunzi in the same information with the single offense of attempted murder. The State 
did not charge Tunzi with "multiple criminal offenses in the same informationf,]" and the juvenile court's bind-over 
did not necessarily include a finding of "probable cause to believe that those crimes have been committed and 
that the defendant committed them . . . ." Id. at § 78-3a-602(7). Consequently, the third degree felony aggravated 
assault was not an "other offense" under subsection 7, and the district court did not have jurisdiction to enter a 
conviction therefor. Id, 
1117 Further, even if it is assumed that the information effectively charges lesser included offenses prior to the 
requested instructions on such offenses, the included offenses at that point can be only those "whose statutory 
elements are necessarily included within the statutory elements of the charged offense." SJate_y. Cajruth, 1999 
UT 107J13, 993 P.2d 869 (emphasis added). The elements of aggravated assault are not necessarily included 
within the statutory elements of attempted murder. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-201 (1996) (listing elements 
of criminal homicide) wjth id. § 76-5-103 (listing elements of aggravated assault including elements of intentionally 
causing serious bodily injury to another or using a dangerous weapon or other means of force likely to produce 
death or serious bodily injury). Therefore, the information charging Tunzi with attempted murder did not include 
the charge of aggravated assault at the time of the bind-over. 
1J18 Finally, we find the State's argument unpersuasive because it would be contrary to the purposes of the 
Juvenile Court Act of 1996 to interpret the term "charges" in subsection 10 to include charges other than those 
requiring bind-over under the Serious Youth Offender Act. ^  See State v. Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993) (stating "if there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or application of the provisions of an act, it 
is appropriate to analyze the act in its entirety, in light of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in 
accordance with its intent and purpose" (internal quotations and citations omitted)). Specifically, it would be unjust 
and contrary to a minor's best interests to require a minor to "answer in district court in the same manner as an 
adult" when the minor has not been convicted of any of the violent felonies enumerated in the Serious Youth 
Offender A c t - See InreA.B., 936 P.2d 1091, 1098 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (stating Serious Youth Offender Act 
allows violent juveniles to be held accountable in district court to protect "the public from juveniles who are just as 
dangerous as adult criminals"). Consequently, we conclude that the Legislature's use of the term "charges" in 
subsection 10, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(10) (1996), refers to the serious youth offender charge(s) that require 
a juvenile court to bind a minor over to district court and does not include "other offenses arising from the same 
criminal episode." |cL § 78-30-602(7). 
CONCLUSION 
1J19 Tunzi was found not guilty of attempted murder, and the lesser included offense of second degree 
aggravated assault was, in effect, dismissed. Although the trial court entered a conviction for third degree felony 
aggravated assault, third degree felony aggravated assault is not an offense over which the district court may 
retain jurisdiction over Tunzi. Therefore, the juvenile court regained jurisdiction over Tunzi pursuant to subsection 
10 of the Serious Youth Offender Act at the time that Tunzi was acquitted of attempted murder and the court 
determined that his conviction should be for third degree felony aggravated assault. Accordingly, we vacate 
Tunzi's conviction and remand to the district court with instructions to transfer the case to the juvenile court for 
entry of an adjudication of guilt for third degree felony aggravated assault. 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
1J20 I CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
ORME, Judge (concurring): 
H21 I concur in the court's opinion, but must note that I find the statute to be, if not ambiguous, at least perplexing. 
I believe the main issue presents a much closer question than the lead opinion recognizes. 
1J22 My puzzlement concerns subsection 10 of the Serious Youth Offender Act, which states: 
The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of Youth Corrections regain jurisdiction 
and any authority previously exercised over the juvenile when there is an acquittal, a finding of not 
guilty, or dismissal of the charges in the district court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(10) (1999). The subsection is capable of two interpretations, neither of which is very 
satisfying. One view-that offered by the State-is that subsection 10 merely recognizes that if a juvenile defendant 
is cleared of any and all charges in a proceeding that originated under the Serious Youth Offender Act, the 
juvenile justice system may go ahead and deal with unrelated matters involving the juvenile. The glaring difficulty 
with this interpretation is that this would be exactly the result if subsection 10 did not exist. In other words, under 
this interpretation subsection 10 merely states the obvious and is completely unnecessary. Courts are 
understandably reluctant to conclude that legislatures would enact into law provisions that do nothing at all. 
1J23 The other view-the one offered by appellant and embraced in the lead opinion-is that the balance of a 
proceeding will revert to the juvenile justice system once the core charge-and perhaps any other charge that 
passes muster under subsection 7-has been resolved, even if the juvenile defendant stands convicted in district 
court. Thus, a defendant could be properly tried in district court on a Serious Youth Offender Act crime. He could 
be acquitted of that charge but convicted of a lesser included offense not before the district court pursuant to 
subsection 7. If he were acquitted of the core charge, the district court in which he was convicted of the lesser 
offense would, at the same instant, lose jurisdiction, and the case would revert to the juvenile court. 
1J24 I am not aware of any explicit mechanism by which the juvenile court can take over a district court case that 
has resulted in a conviction, whether by jury or bench trial or by plea bargain. If the Legislature really meant to 
require such, I cannot imagine why it would not have provided some time frames, specified which court would 
entertain motions for new t r i a l , ^ and made explicit the idea that the juvenile court would impose sentence.11^ In 
short, I have a hard time believing the Legislature had in mind that part of a district court case-indeed, a district 
court conviction-would revert to the juvenile court for further action without saying a little bit more about how such 
an aberrational approach to criminal jurisprudence would work in practice. 
TI25 Basically, then, we must decide whether the Legislature, in adopting subsection 10, meant to say nothing at 
all and was just wasting space in the Utah Code, or whether it meant to say something but did not say it very 
clearly or completely. Obviously, neither outcome is ideal. On balance, however, I believe the second option is 
more defensible, and on that basis I concur in the court's opinion. In doing so, I recognize there is about a fifty 
percent chance we are wrong. If we are, with the problem having been highlighted by this case, I am confident the 
Legislature will speedily rectify our mistake. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. The verdict found Tunzi "guilty of aggravated assault, a lesser included offense of the Information." 
2. The court also ordered Tunzi to pay restitution to the victim, attorney fees, and a combined fine and surcharge 
of $5,000.00. 
3. We also note that the case proceeded under the original case number. 
4. The Serious Youth Offender Act also provides that, under certain circumstances, a minor may be bound over to 
district court even if the minor has not been charged with one of the enumerated offenses However, Tunzi was 
charged with one of the enumerated offenses, therefore, we focus our analysis on the offenses listed in 
subsection (1)(a) See id 
5 Utah Code Ann § 78-3a-104 (1996) enumerates matters over which the juvenile court has exclusive 
jurisdiction 
6 We also note that the Serious Youth Offender Act is contained in Part 6 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1996, 
which is titled Transfer of Jurisdiction See Utah Code Ann §§ 78-3a-601 to -603 (1996) 
7 The State conceded, and the court agreed, that the appropriate treatment of the ambiguous verdict was entry 
of conviction for aggravated assault as a third degree lelony Therefore, when the court granted Tunzi's motion to 
impose the third degree felony charge, the court's ruling operated as a de facto dismissal of the second degree 
aggravated assault charge 
8 The purpose of the Juvenile Court Act of 1996 is to, among other things, impose appropriate sanctions on 
minors who have violated the law and strive to act in the best interests of the children in all cases See Utah Code 
Ann §78-3a-102(5)(a)(g)(1996) 
[TJhere are critically important differences in the treatment of those juveniles tried as adults 
compared to those left in the juvenile system For instance, cases tried in the juvenile court are 
considered civil rather than criminal proceedings [See] Utah Code Ann § 78-3a-[117 (Supp 2000)] 
This has significant ramifications for an individual's future criminal record Moreover, any juvenile 
committed to a secure facility under the direction of the Division of Youth Corrections must be 
released at age twenty-one Utah Code Ann § 62A-7-108(1) Therefore, because section [78-3a-
602] applies only to individuals sixteen years of age or older, a juvenile in the statutory class who is 
left in the juvenile system faces a maximum potential sentence of five years or less 
The foregoing scenario is a dramatic contrast to that facing another juvenile in the same statutory 
class who is charged as an adult Aside from acquiring a permanent criminal record, this juvenile 
faces a much greater deprivation of personal liberty than that risked by his or her counterpart 
who is tried as a juvenile Moreover, rather than facing detention at a juvenile facility, these 
offenders are eligible for housing in the state prison or other adult facilities 
State v Mohi, 901 P 2d 991, 998 (Utah 1995) 
10 As the district court loses jurisdiction with the acquittal or dismissal of the core charge I guess the juvenile 
court would necessarily entertain any motion for new trial concerning conviction on a lesser included offense 
Such a scenario is problematic The juvenile court would have to decide whether, for instance, newly discovered 
evidence would possibly change the outcome in a case it did not try 
11 The sentencing implications are perhaps most troubling The view we adopt leaves a judge who did not 
preside over the case imposing sentence 
ADDENDUM B 
78-3a-601. Jurisdiction of district court. 
The district court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all persons 
16 years of age or older charged by information or indictment with: 
(1) an offense which would be murder or aggravated murder if commit-
ted by an adult; or 
(2) an offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult if the 
minor has been previously committed to a secure facility as defined in 
Section 62A-7-101. 
78-3a-602. Serious youth offender — Procedure. 
(1) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or attorney 
general charging a minor 16 years of age or older with a felony shall be by 
criminal information and filed in the juvenile court if the information charges 
any of the following offenses: 
(a) any felony violation of: 
(i) Section 76-6-103, aggravated arson; 
(ii) Subsection 76-5-103(1 )(a), aggravated assault, involving inten-
tionally causing serious bodily injury to another, 
(iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated kidnaping; 
(iv) Section 76-6-203, aggravated burglary, 
(v) Section 76-6-302, aggravated robbery; 
(vi) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault; 
(vii) Section 76-10-508, discharge of a firearm from a vehicle; 
(viii) Section 76-5-202, attempted aggravated murder, or 
(ix) Section 76-5-203, attempted murder, or 
(b) an offense other than those listed in Subsection (l)(a) involving the 
use of a dangerous weapon which would be a felony if committed by an 
adult, and the minor has been previously adjudicated or convicted of an 
offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon which also would have 
been a felony if committed by an adult. 
(2) All proceedings before the juvenile court related to charges filed under 
Subsection (1) shall be conducted in conformity with the rules established by 
the Utah Supreme Court. 
(3) (a) If the information alleges the violation of a felony listed in Subsec-
tion (1), the state shall have the burden of going forward with its case and 
the burden of proof to establish probable cause to believe that one of the 
crimes listed in Subsection (1) has been committed and that the defendant 
committed it. If proceeding under Subsection (l)(b), the state shall have 
the additional burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the defendant has previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense 
involving the use of a dangerous weapon. 
(b) If the juvenile court judge finds the state has met its burden under 
this subsection, the court shall order that the defendant be bound over and 
held to answer in the district court in the same manner as an adult unless 
the juvenile court judge finds that all of the following conditions exist: 
(i) the minor has not been previously adjudicated delinquent for an 
offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a 
felony if committed by an adult; 
(ii) that if the offense was committed with one or more other 
persons, the minor appears to have a lesser degree of culpability than 
the codefendants; and 
(iii) that the minor's role in the offense was not committed in a 
violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner. 
(c) Once the state has met its burden under this subsection as to a 
showing of probable cause, the defendant shall have the burden of going 
forward and presenting evidence as to the existence of the above condi-
tions. 
(d) If the juvenile court judge finds by clear and convincing evidence 
that all the above conditions are satisfied, the court shall so state in its 
findings and order the minor held for trial as a minor and shall proceed 
upon the information as though it were a juvenile petition. 
(4) If the juvenile court judge finds that an offense has been committed, but 
that the state has not met its burden of proving the other criteria needed to 
bind the defendant over under Subsection (1), the juvenile court judge shall 
order the defendant held for trial as a minor and shall proceed upon the 
information as though it were a juvenile petition. 
(5) At the time of a bind over to district court a criminal warrant of arrest 
shall issue. The defendant shall have the same right to bail as any other 
criminal defendant and shall be advised of that right by the juvenile court 
judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in accordamce with Title 77, 
Chapter 20, Bail. 
(6) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury charging a violation under 
this section, the preliminary examination held by the juvenile court judge need 
not include a finding of probable cause that the crime alleged in the indictment 
was committed and that the defendant committed it, but the juvenile court 
shall proceed in accordance with this section regarding the additional consid-
erations listed in Subsection (3)(b). 
(7) When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the same 
information or indictment and is bound over to answer in the district court for 
one or more charges under this section, other offenses arising from the same 
criminal episode and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged 
against him shall be considered together with those charges, and where the 
court finds probable cause to believe that those crimes have been committed 
and that the defendant committed them, the defendant shall also be bound 
over to the district court to answer for those charges. 
(8) A minor who is bound over to answer as an adult in the district court 
under this section or on whom an indictment has been returned by a grand 
jury, is not entitled to a preliminary examination in the district court. 
(9) Allegations contained in the indictment or information that the defen-
dant has previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the 
use of a dangerous weapon, or is 16 years of age or older, are not elements of 
the criminal offense and do not need to be proven at trial in the district court. 
(10) The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of Youth 
Corrections regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the 
juvenile when there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilt]/, or dismissal of the 
charges in the district court. 
78-3a-603. Certification hearings — Juvenile court to 
hold preliminary hearing — Factors considered 
by juvenile court for waiver of jurisdiction to 
district court. 
(1) If a criminal information filed in accordance with Subsection 78-3a-
502(3) alleges the commission of an act which would constitute a felony if 
committed by an adult, the juvenile court shall conduct a preliminary hearing. 
(2) At the preliminary hearing the state shall have the burden of going 
forward with its case and the burden of establishing: 
(a) probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and that the 
defendant committed it; and 
(b) by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would be contrary to the 
best interests of the minor or of the public for the juvenile court to retain 
jurisdiction. 
(3) In considering whether or not it would be contrary to the best interests 
of the minor or of the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction, the 
juvenile court shall consider, and may base its decision on, the finding of one or 
more of the following factors: 
(a) the seriousness of the offense and whether the protection of the 
community requires isolation of the minor beyond that afforded by 
juvenile facilities; 
(b) whether the alleged offense was committed by the minor in concert 
with two or more persons under circumstances which would subject the 
minor to enhanced penalties under Section 76-3-203.1 were he an adult; 
(c) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, 
premeditated, or willful manner, 
(d) whether the alleged offense was against persons or property, greater 
weight being given to offenses against persons, except as provided in 
Section 76-8-418; 
(e) the maturity of the minor as determined by considerations of his 
home, environment, emotional attitude, and pattern of living; 
(f) the record and previous history of the minor; 
(g) the likelihood of rehabilitation of the minor by use of facilities 
available to the juvenile court; 
(h) the desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one 
court when the minor's associates in the alleged offense are adults who 
will be charged with a crime in the district court; 
(i) whether the minor used a firearm in the commission of an offense; 
and 
(j) whether the minor possessed a dangerous weapon on or about school 
premises as provided in Section 76-10-505.5. 
(4) The amount of weight to be given to each of the factors listed in 
Subsection (3) is discretionary with the court. 
(5) (a) Written reports and other materials relating to the minor's mental, 
physical, educational, and social history may be considered by the court. 
(b) If requested by the minor, the minor's parent, guardian, or other 
interested party, the court shall require the person or agency preparing 
the report and other material to appear and be subject to both direct and 
cross-examination. 
(6) At the conclusion of the state's case, the minor may testify under oath, 
call witnesses, cross-examine adverse witnesses, and present evidence on the 
factors required by Subsection (3). 
(7) If the court finds the state has met its burden under Subsection (2), the 
court may enter an order 
(a) certifying that finding; and 
(b) directing that the minor be held for criminal proceedings in the 
district court. 
(8) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury, the preliminary examina-
tion held by the juvenile court need not include a finding of probable cause, but 
the juvenile court shall proceed in accordance with this section regarding the 
additional consideration referred to in Subsection (2)(b). 
(9) The provisions of Section 78-3a-512, Section 78-3a-513, and other 
provisions relating to proceedings in juvenile cases are applicable to the 
hearing held under this section to the extent they are pertinent. 
(10) A minor who has been directed to be held for criminal proceedings in 
the district court is not entitled to a preliminary examination in the district 
court. 
(11) A minor who has been certified for trial in the district court shall have 
the same right to bail as any other criminal defendant and shall be advised of 
that right by the juvenile court judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail 
in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail. 
(12) When a minor has been certified to the district court under this section 
or when a criminal information or indictment is filed in a court of competent 
jurisdiction before a committing magistrate charging the minor with an offense 
described in Section 78-3a-602, the jurisdiction of the Division of Youth 
Corrections and the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the minor is 
terminated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising from the 3ame 
criminal episode, and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged 
against him, except as provided in Subsection (14). 
(13) A minor may be convicted under this section on the charges filed or on 
any other offense arising out of the same criminal episode. 
(14) The-juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and die Division of Youth 
Corrections regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the 
minor when there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of the 
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Defendant was convicted in the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake Department, Judith S.H. Atherton, J., of 
aggravated assault. Defendant appealed. Defendant 
filed motion for summary reversal upon discovery that 
videotape of second day of trial had been lost and that 
transcript consequently could not be prepared. The 
Court of Appeals denied motion and remanded for trial 
court to prepare statement of evidence or proceedings. 
Defendant sought writ of certiorari. The Supreme 
Court, Durham, J., held that new trial, not attempt to 
reconstruct record, was appropriate remedy in case in 
which half of record had been lost and main issue was 
sufficiency of evidence to support conviction. 
Reversed and remanded for new trial. 
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New trial, not attempt to reconstruct record through 
statement of evidence or proceedings, was appropriate 
remedy for loss of videotape that made it impossible to 
prepare transcript for second day of two-day trial, 
where one half of trial record had been lost and main 
issue on appeal was sufficiency of evidence to support 
conviction. 
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Joan C. Watt, John O'Connell, Jr., Salt Lake City, for 
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DURHAM, Justice: 
If 1 Petitioner, Joseph P. Tunzi, by writ of certiorari, 
seeks review of an order of remand issued by the court 
of appeals directing the trial court to prepare and 
approve a "statement of the evidence or proceedings" 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(g). 
We grant petitioner's writ of certiorari, reverse the court 
of appeals, and remand the case to the trial court for a 
new trial. 
*817 f 2 Following a two-day trial, petitioner was 
convicted of aggravated assault, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999). 
Subsequent to his conviction, petitioner filed a timely 
notice of appeal raising the following two issues: 
(1) Whether there was insufficient evidence for the 
jury to convict petitioner of aggravated assault; and 
(2) Whether the trial court erred in failing to find that 
it had lost jurisdiction and failing to remand the case 
back to juvenile court. 
Petitioner's counsel thereafter learned that the trial 
court was unable to locate the videotape of the second 
day of trial, and that a transcript of that day would 
therefore not be available. As a result, petitioner filed 
a motion for summary reversal in the court of appeals 
seeking a new trial. The State agreed that such a 
reversal was appropriate. Ultimately, the court of 
appeals denied petitioner's motion for summary 
reversal and remanded the case with instructions to 
reconstruct the record of the second day of trial. 
If 3 We disagree with the court of appeals' action upon 
petitioner's motion for summary reversal. A main 
issue on appeal in this case is whether there is 
sufficient evidence in the record to support petitioner's 
conviction. Resolution of this issue will necessarily 
involve reviewing the evidence contained in the record. 
At present, the record does not contain evidence 
presented on the second day of petitioner's two-day 
trial. During that day, the State called half of its 
witnesses, including the only witness directly 
implicating petitioner. Thus, fully one half of the case 
against petitioner is missing from the record. While 
reconstruction of the record may be appropriate in 
circumstances where only a minor portion of the record 
is missing, such an attempt, in our experience, is 
unduly burdensome for the trial court and the parties 
when a major portion of the record is missing, as in the 
instant case. Moreover, attempts to reconstruct major 
portions of records often prove to be futile because 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
such reconstructions often fail to provide the detail 
necessary to resolve the issues on appeal. The burdens 
and futility associated with reconstructing a record are 
increased exponentially when the issue on appeal 
concerns the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a 
conviction, as it does here. Therefore, to avoid 
needless burdens and delay, we reverse the court of 
appeals and remand this case to the trial court for a new 
trial. 
U 4 Chief Justice HOWE, Associate Chief Justice 
RUSSON, Justice DURRANT, and Justice WILKINS 
concur in Justice DURHAM'S opinion. 
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ADDENDUM D 
SENATE BILL 111 




DAY 25--FEBRUARY 9, 









Senate Bill 111, Serious Youth Offender, by 
Senator Hillyard and the Committee Report 
February 6, 1995: "Mr. President, the Human 
Services Committee reports a favorable 
recommendation on Senate Bill 111 with 
amendments on pages 7, 8, 9, 13, and 13. 
Respectfully, Charles Stewart, Acting 
Committee Chair." 
Move we adopt the Committee Report. 
Motion to adopt the Committee Report. All 
those in favor say "aye." 
Aye. 
Are there any opposed? 
(None) 
Seeing no opposition, the bill is before us, 
Senate Bill 111. Senator Hillyard. 
Thank you, Mr. President. I want to direct 
the Senate's attention to the fact that this 
is probably going to be one of the most 
important pieces of legislation that we 
consider this session as it relates to crime, 
and it's a part of a package. It's not the 
sole crime package, but it's part of it. 
The body may also remember a year ago, I 
filed the bill under the same name, quite a 
bit different from this bill. It was Senate 
Bill 249. We had a very interesting debate 
in which I had opposition from a number of 
people in law enforcement because I felt that 
it was doing the proper thing to give more 
power to the juvenile court judges to address 
the serious problems of gang and youth 
violence. 
This body chose to adopt and pass that bill 
unanimously. We realized in passing it, it 
carried a significant fiscal note, but we 
also knew that it would be giving a message 
that we wanted something done in this area. 
And I can report back-- since that action in 
the past year, there has been a tremendous 
amount of work by all the various agencies to 
have come together to biring to you Senate 
Bill 111, which is a serious youth offender 
bill. 
This bill is being supported by a number of 
people including the Governor, the Commission 
on Criminal and Juvenile Justice, Utah 
Sentencing Commission, Utah Substance Abuse 
and Anti-violence Council, Utah Judicial 
Council, juvenile court judges (and I should 
indicate that the juvenile court judges have 
felt left out in the process, now feel very 
much a part of this process in coming to 
grips with this), Board of Youth Corrections, 
Utah Law Enforcement Legislative Committee, 
and many, many others. 
Let me just indicate that the bill does three 
things. Number one, it provides that if a 
youth 16 or 17 years old is charged with 
aggravated murder or murder, which was 
formerly called first or second degree 
murder, if they're charged with this, they 
will be automatically transferred and treated 
in the adult system. 
One of the issues now pending before the Utah 
Supreme Court involves a young man here in 
Salt Lake City who shot and killed another 
person, I think at the Triad Center. The 
case up on appeal is whether our current 
system is legal, where you can be certified 
or directly filed at the discretion of the 
prosecutor. The issue is whether, how much 
discretion the prosecutor can have. And this 
bill takes away from that, and if the 
prosecutor chooses to charge as first or 
second degree murder, aggravated or murder, 
the young man or young woman is automatically 
treated in the adult system. 
The second place where it automatically goes 
is if that youth has been committed to a 
secure facility. They use the term committed 
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in juvenile court. We would talk about 
confinement in a jail. But the committed, 
and then commits a felony, which is another 
serious offense, then they automatically are 
placed in the adult system. The reason being 
is the feeling is that if you have been 
committed in the juvenile court system, that 
is the most severe punishment they can give 
to you. And if that hasn't worked, the 
feeling is that you now completed the, what 
is available in the juvenile court system, 
and you will now, as the saying goes, if you 
commit an adult crime, you'll spend adult 
time. 
The third issue this case creates, and a 
thing that I really like about it, is that it 
lists a number of very serious aggravated 
offenses such as aggravated arson, aggravated 
assault, aggravated kidnapping, etc. If that 
is committed by a youth 16 or 17 years of 
age, then there's a process set up whereby he 
is certified over to district court but can 
be retained by the juvenile court. So the 
juvenile court will have a chance to hear 
that in a preliminary hearing type situation 
and be able to make a decision that, no, 
there are programs for this youth that would 
still make him amenable to what can be done 
in juvenile court and he would be retained. 
It does away with the direct filing so the 
court, the prosecutor will not be able to 
directly file any more, but will go through a 
preliminary hearing process in front of the 
juvenile court for those youth under the age 
of 16. At our committee hearing, we had an 
argument by the ACLU that this violated 
constitutional rights. I'm reminded of a 
statement my good friend Senator Chic Bullen 
said, if you get four lawyers together 
arguing what is due process, you'll get six 
different opinions. But I can assure you 
that this bill has been examined very 
carefully by lawyers on that issue of due 
process and feel satisfied that it does 
satisfy the due process requirement. 
Another question came up in committee whether 
we ought to lower that age from 16 to 15. 
The 16 age was taken because there are a 
number of factors that occur at 16, but also 
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in looking at the implementation of this 
bill, the current data would show that there 
are probably going to be between 50 and 75 
youth that will be impacted by that that have 
just been in place. To lower that age, we 
may come back and want to do that. But this 
time, as we move forward, we think the 
appropriate age is 16 and that's the line 
that we want to draw. 
Again, the message, we hope, and it's a 
tragic part of our society, that there's 
going to be youth who are going to end up in 
the state prison because of their actions. 
But the feeling is that there is mechanisms 
within the adult system that if they really 
don't warramt going to state prison, they can 
be protected; but, on the other hand, many of 
these youths or most of these youths will end 
up in prison anyway, and we may as well get 
them down there and protect society during 
that time period. 
This bill has been included in the Governor's 
budget for funding, has a fiscal note 
obviously with it. But as I've indicated to 
the committee and I'll indicate to you, it's 
only a part of the Governor's program. The 
other very important part is to address the 
things that we need to do in prevention. 
Some of the programs in public education the 
Governor's already led into to do and that 
we've done, I think, will impact what we're 
doing. Also, I think this gives a signal 
that will be helpful in the areas of 
prevention. And the other part of the parcel 
will be, sadly enough, construction of more 
prison space or making available. Some of 
these youths, quite frankly, are a severe 
danger not only to themselves but to society 
and should be removed from the streets. 
Mr. President, that is a synopsis of Senate 
Bill 111. Again, has wide and broad base 
support. I think it is an important step for 
this Legislature to take. 
Mr. President: Thank you. Senator Hull. 
Sen. Hull: Thank you. I was in the committee when this 
was heard, and I do have some concern. I am 
supportive of this bill. My concern is the 
age at which they can be certified for the 
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district court, which is 16. And it's been 
discussed. 
Sen. Hillyard: They can certify below the age of 16. 
Sen. Hull: That is correct. 
Sen. Hillyard: It's automatic at 16. 
Sen. Hull: It is automatic at 16. And my concern, and 
I've asked this question on several of the 
bills that have come up dealing with juvenile 
justice, why they selected 16, and it's kind 
of a random age, and I've received several 
answers. One that, I guess the best answer 
was that's the age you get a license so 
you're more accountable. But there will be 
other bills coming through, and I think I 
will make, try to make an amendment to make 
that lower, and another one dealing with 
confidentiality. But I'm wondering, really 
in our society where these kids are in 
schools, it's drilled into their minds that 
at age Ninth Grade that, as least as far as 
their academic behaviors are concerned, those 
go in to stone, those credits and all their 
behaviors and that are kept on school records 
for public use for the rest of their lives, 
from Ninth Grade on. And I'm wondering, if 
we ought to not, since that is already 
embedded in their minds that they should be 
accountable then, the colleges use the Ninth, 
Tenth and Eleventh Grades for their 
accountabilities, if not that is the age 
where they ought to be taught in the courts 
to be accountable, too. That's my only 
concern. I am for, supportive of this bill 
as is. 
Sen. Hillyard: I appreciate Senator Hull raising that issue. 
And in response to it, in talking to Camille 
Anthony, who is the director of CCDJ, her 
comment was again, in checking back over, 
they wanted to keep it at age 16 to see how 
the thing works out. And if it turns out, 
Senator Hull, I would be more than happy to 
have you sponsor the bill to lower the age. 
Mr. President: Senator Howell. 
Sen. Howell: Thank you, Mr. President. Maybe we can just 
make a little amendment here to do that 
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little friendly amendment, Camille. How 












Senator Hillyard, as you know, I had the bill 
with regards to concealed weapons and minors, 
and that was one that I was very concerned 
about because on a daily basis, we see, not 
on a daily basis but quite often, we see 
young people who are carrying concealed 
weapons walking up and down Main Street and 
so on and so forth. How would that, how 
would your bill deal with those offenders? 
We clarify a conflict in the law currently. 
There's a conflict in the law because 
prosecutors can tell you that they can 
directly file on anyone directly in an adult 
court. 
Right. 
That's what they did in the case of the West 
High student. 
Right. 
The juvenile court judges will tell you, in 
reading the law, they can't do that and they 
can bring them back. Now we resolve that 
issue. They can no longer directly file. 
What's going to happen, if you're 16 or 
older, one of these crimes, then you'll go 
directly to an adult system. If you're under 
age 16, you will then file in juvenile court 
but request the juvenile court certify the 
youth over. So you could have a 14 year old 
who could be, in fact, certified over and 
treated as an adult, but the juvenile court 
would have a preliminary hearing to decide 
whether that transfer ought to be made. 
So the juvenile justice then would make the 




Okay. Are we confident, and I guess this 
gets back to the age factor, are we confident 




when there's a 14 year old who has been 
involved in a felony, let's say? I mean, how 
do I get warm fuzzies that they're going to 
make this decision about turning them over? 
I mean, that's my concern, is that kid, 
individual, who sees no future but they're 
willing to shoot someone. 
Well, let me tell you the problem we had last 
year and what got the opposition to my bill 
was the frustration of juvenile court judges 
that they would get a young man or young 
woman and say, "You're going to spend eight 
months in a secure facility," walk out of the 
court, and youth correction would say, "We 
don't have the room for you, you're out of 
here." It was a joke. And so what we've 
really done is now given the juvenile court 
more play in what they're going to do. 
Okay. And that, that's the very situation is 
to say, "We're filled up, sorry you've 
committed this terrible heinous crime, but we 
can't take any more." So I think that, if 
what you're saying is now they have an 
alternative to say, "You're certified as an 





And that's correct. And that's part of the 
package. I mean, to do this bill alone 
without the prevention, without more bed 
space, would be a mockery to the system and, 
I think, a fraud on the people of the state 
of Utah. We're doing all three of them. 
Mr. President, I withdrew my senate bill with 
regards to juveniles and possession of guns 
for this very reason. And this satisfies all 
the requirements that I had in that bill, so 
I commend Senator Hillyard for doing a great 
job on this. 
Thank you, Senator Howell. Senator Hillyard. 
Are there any further questions of Senator 
Hillyard? Senator Hillyard, would you like 
to sum up. Oh, excuse me, Senator 
McAllister. 
Sen. McAllister: Senator Hillyard, I have a concern with 
regard to the fiscal note that's on page 21. 











Now those figures, now if I understand 
correctly, you expect that there would be 2 
murders within that first full year, 15 first 
degree, and so on, is that correct? 
I'd have to, I'd have to go to Camille, who 
has put this in. 
Is that a proper assumption? 
Yes. 
Well, the concern I have then, if you look 10 
years from now, you're expecting 9 times more 
murders, over 10, probably 12 times more 
first degree, probably 3-1/2 times more 
felonies, and so on. Do you really feel that 
in 10 years, we're going to be living in an 
environment, in a society where such crimes, 
or is it just population? I'm really 
overwhelmed with that kind of statistics. 
I understand. It's a cumulative buildup type 
thing in the system. But, again, I can have 
somebody address that fiscal note directly if 
you want. But my understanding is, is that 
the 18 reflects a buildup of over those time 
periods. 
I see then. It says 10th year, and there's 
nothing to indicate accumulative on that. 
Are you saying then that the fiscal note for 
the first year would be $1,338,000, but 
because we're dealing with a part of a year, 
it's $351,800? 
That's correct. 
But in the 10th year, we're not looking at 
$8,000,000 in that year alone (but that's in 
a sense what it says), but you're saying, 
then if the first year is $1,338,000, it 
ought to be something like 10 times that in 
the 10th year, and it isn't. 
I would have to have Leo, who prepared the 
fiscal note, as you know, he doesn't go just 
directly on what somebody tells him, he put 
some things together. I'd be glad to answer 
it on the third reading. 
Sen. McAllister: I think that's fine, but I'd like an answer 
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I'll get that information. 
Any further questions of Senator Hillyard? 
Mr. President. 
Mr. President, before I sum up, personal 
privilege, I have an unrelated matter. 
Mr. President; 
Mr. President, in summation, I think that 
we've pointed out very well this is a bill 
that's been worked on very hard by a number 
of people. I am fortunate enough to be just 
merely a spokesman to represent hundreds of 
hours that have been put on this problem. We 
realize this is not going to solve the 
problem, it's a combination of other things 
that need to be put together. But I think 
it's an excellent beginning, and I would urge 
the support of this body, and I'd call for a 
question on the bill. 




DAY 45--MARCH 1, 1995 




Senate Bill 111, Serious Youth Offender, by 
Lyle W. Hillyard. Committee vote: 9 yes, 
0 no, 3 absent. 
Representative Fox. 
Yes, thank you, Mr. Speaker. Before I begin, 
1 would like to move the amendments that have 
been passed out under my name for Senate 
Bill 111. Perhaps we ought to check and make 
sure the body has those. Just been passed 









Those who do not have the amendments of 
Senate Bill 111, raise your hand so we can 
see. The circle does not, maybe we ought to 
circle and go on for a minute. 
That will be just fine while the 
pages . . . . 
I have a motion to circle Senate Bill 111. 
Discussion that motion. Saying that, all in 




The motion carries. 
Madam Reading Clerk. 










Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I would move that we 
uncircle Senate Bill 111. 
We have a motion to remove the circle from 
Senate Bill 111. Would you state the title. 
Yes, Serious Youth Offender. 
Discussion of the motion to uncircle. Seeing 




The motion carries, 
You may proceed. 
The bill is uncircled. 
Yes, thank you. I think everyone now has the 
amendments that were just passed out. I 
would like to move those amendments on page 
19, line 21 and after 1, delete "proceedings" 
and insert " except as provided in section 
78-3a-25 and 78-3a-25.1 proceedings" and page 
19, line 29, after "violations" insert 
"criminal proceedings under section 78-3a-25 








jurisdiction of the court under section 78-
3a-16(l)." Now, what that does is currently 
our code states that juvenile court evidence 
may not be used any place else other than the 
juvenile court. To effect the provisions of 
SB111, Serious Youth Offender, we need to 
exempt the crimes commitced that would fall 
under this bill. So we wanted to, we have to 
make that exemption in the current code. 
The motion is that we accept the pink sheet 
amendment under Representative Fox's name 
dated February 23, 1995 at 5:08 p.m. 
Discussion of the motion to amend. Seeing 
none, all those in favor of the motion to 




The motion carries, 
You may proceed. 
The bill is amended. 
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Unfortunately, Utah 
has seen a tremendous expansion of our young 
people who are committing serious crimes--
murder, all sorts of drive-by shootings. We 
see all these things happening. Frankly, 
we're at a loss to how to deal with these 
young criminals. They are still under age, 
but they are hardened criminals nonetheless. 
The serious youth offender bill is the 
product of a year-long effort from Utah's 
criminal and juvenile justice professionals 
to create a new category of crime that will 
safeguard the public and hold violent and 
chronic juvenile offenders accountable. What 
it does is it makes it so the district court 
has exclusive original jurisdiction over 
juveniles age 16 and older charged with 
aggravated murder, murder and any felony 
committed subsequent to confinement in the 
most secure youth offender facilities. 
Juveniles age 16 years and older who commit 
one of the other ten serious offenses against 
a person will be charged with adult crimes. 
The preliminary hearing is held in the 







finds probable cause, the burden will shift 
to the defendant to show that he or she 
should remain in the juvenile court. And 
unless the defendant fits some stringent 
criteria, he or she will go directly to trial 
as an adult in the district court. Juveniles 
who do not meet the serious youth offender 
criteria may still be tried as adults in 
district court under the current 
certification process. For consistency, 
those cases will also have preliminary 
hearings in the juvenile court. I am glad to 
answer questions. 
Representative Bresnahan. 
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Will the sponsor 
yield? 
Yes. 
I have a question regarding the section 
beginning on page 6 and 7 regarding a felony 
committed by a juvenile age 14 or older. And 
if you wouldn't mind, I'd like to understand 
the difference between what was said earlier 
in the bill about 16 and older and this 
section regarding 14 and older. 
Under current law, the burden of proof is on 
the State to show why they shouldn't. This 
new change, it would shift that burden to the 
defendant to prove why they should be judged 







As an adult, I'm sorry. 
This makes it easier for us to certify some 
of these offenders as adults? Is that my 
understanding? Is that correct? 
Yes. 
That's the only question I have. I'd like to 
say that I do support this bill very 
heartily. It is needed. I have been, I've 
taken the time to tour our juvenile 
facilities. I've gone through every step of 
the way that a juvenile could go through 
those facilities at all the different levels. 
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And I've had opportunity not only to 
interview the staff at those facilities but 
many of the juveniles involved there as well 
as some of their parents. It is quite clear 
to me that we are dealing with a large 
portion of the juvenile population who are 
not only violent offenders but they are 
repeat violent offenders. 
And after having an opportunity to first-hand 
see them and to gain some understanding of 
their circumstances and the various things 
that are happening in their lives, I think 
the greatest service that we can do for them 
is to intercede as early as possible in the 
chain of events that lead them down a life-
long road of violence and constantly 
requiring incarceration by our society. 
Hopefully, by taking action early, by being 
strong early and getting tough early, we're 
going to prevent the continual repeat 
offenses that seem to take place over and 
over again, where we're hearing stories 
almost daily of youths that have been through 
this system time and time again, go back out 
into society, and continue to cause greater 
harm and greater injury to others, create 
more crime. And not only do they do get 
involved in it, but they're bringing others 
along with them. I believe that the only way 
that we're going to be able to see a decrease 
is to get tougher, particularly on the youth 
offenders, and I think this is an excellent, 
excellent bill and it's worthy of all our 
support. Thank you. 
Mr. Speaker: Representative Barth. 
Rep. Barth: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Let me start off by 
saying this is a good bill. There's a lot of 
thought and energy that have gone into this 
bill. This bill is a couple of things, 
though. It's not a cure-all. Anybody who 
thinks that this bill is going to take all of 
these serious youth offenders off the streets 
and we're going to be rid of that problem is 
mistaken, but it goes a long ways in doing 
that. It's not the last step in fixing a 
system that is antiquated that we need to 
take, but it is a significant and important 
step. This is going to take some kids off 
the street and put them into the adult system 
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faster than if we don't pass this bill. This 








going to get 
They're conti 
had their one 
They're going 
We need to be 
though. The 
at the juveni 
are there. 
about 16 year olds that are 
to the adult system eventually, 
nuing their behavior. They've 
shot at the juvenile system. 
to get into the adult system. 
mindful of a couple things, 
kid needs a one-stop good shot 
le system and the resources that 
Some people have said the average stay for a 
juvenile in the juvenile facility is eight 
months. That's true. But you're lumping in 
there children that have been in there for 
years, putting that into the average, take 
the top 10% out and the bottom 10% out; the 
average stay is about three months. That's a 
beds problem. This addresses a different 
problem, and we need to address that beds 
problem as well, and we are in this 
Legislature to some degree. 
We're not throwing kids away after this. The 
kids have had a one-shot at the juvenile 
system, and we need to start getting tough 
with them. We need to let them know that 
their behavior is unacceptable, and they need 
to change if they're going to be allowed out 
in society. I would urge you to vote for 
this bill heartily, but do it mindfully that 
this is not the last step in fixing the 
juvenile justice problem that we've got in 
the state of Utah. This is not going to 
decrease gangs sufficiently that we can stop, 
rest on our laurels and quit. But it is a 
significant and worthwhile first step. 
Representative M_ Johnson. 
Thank you, Mr. Speaker, 
question, please. 
I move previous 
Previous question has been called. All in 





Mr. Speaker: The motion carries. Back to sponsor for 
summation. 
Rep. Fox: I think it's all been said. I urge your 
support. Please vote for the bill. 
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ADDENDUM E 
UTAH STATE SENATE 
FIFTY FOURTH LEGISLATURE 
2002 GENERAL SESSION 
JANUARY 22. 2002 DAY 2. TAPE 4 
CLERK: Senate Bill 26, Senator Hillyard. 
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE: Senator Hillyard, ready to proceed. 
SENATOR HILLYARD: One of the advantages of being here for awhile is you pass a bill 
and you get to come back here the next year and make two amendments to it, and then you 
come back and make four amendments and you end up doing a lot of bills but they all result 
from the work you did on one. 
I don't know how much background I want to give you on the Serious Youth Offender. I 
won't give you a lot but I think you need to know why we're doing what we're doing. The 
Serious Youth Offender was an action we took several years ago with a deep concern about 
some of the youths who were 16 and 17 years old who would normally be so out of control 
that the juvenile court system would have no impact on them whatsoever. We had to have 
a mechanism whereby we could move them into the adult system where the emphasis is more 
on safety and less on rehabilitation because of the limited dollars we have in the juvenile 
court system in which the primary emphasis is on rehabilitation. This bill does two things. 
It actually started out at your request that I combine it in two bills. 
The first part of the bill; under our current law if a juvenile has been in secure confinement 
and then gets out of secure confinement and does something again very serious - zip - they 
go right into the adult system, there's no question about it. Well the problem we found, law 
of unintended consequences, was that these kids talk, and they say "you know, if I get out of 
Decker Lake and I get out in one of these secure places and I assault a guard, then I get 
moved automatically into the adult system even though I have not really served my time 
there, I'm just there right now, have been placed there. And in the adult system I can bail 
out, I can do those things and get out free and so it really is," so they think, "an advantage." 
That's not really the case. We've got some things, but what we do with this bill is simply say 
that if you do that assault while you're at the center it doesn't automatically put you over to 
the adult system. And so that's the first amendment. Youth Corrections have come forward 
to us and said we need to make this amendment because there seems to be some incentive 
on these kids to do an assault because they could move over to the adult system. 
The second part of it was, there was a Supreme Court case that came down on this issue that 
one of these youths again met the criteria, was transferred over because he was charged w ith 
a very serious felony. When the case concluded, the jury, or the judge, in this case the adult 
system, didn't find him guilty of that felony but found him guilty of a misdemeanor. Now 
the question's got to be , "What do we do with him now?" because he was automatically 
certified over because he was charged with this felony but in fact we found him guilty of a 
misdemeanor. Now it's interesting to read the decision of the court because what they did, 
they sent him back to juvenile court and they said, "We don't know the answer, but we're 
sure if we're wrong the legislature will tell us." Well we're here to tell them that they were 
wrong. We made the decision when we did the Serious Youth Offender that if someone does 
something that serious, they've had that kind of background and that kind of help, the 
decision we made is that the rehabilitative thrust of juvenile court should no longer be 
available to them. They ought to move into the adult system with the emphasis on public 
safety. So what this bill says is, if that happens again, because we've made the decision to 
move them over to the adult system, they'll stay in the adult system and be treated for the 
conviction of the misdemeanor as though they had been an adult and convicted of the same 
misdemeanor and treated there. That's what the bill does. It was approved unanimously by 
the interim committee. Again I think it answers a question the Supreme Court asked us the 
answer. I think we're just keeping in policy what we've decided before. 
PRESIDENT: OK. Any questions for Senator Hillyard on this bill? (silence) Being none, 
I'll call for question on the bill. 
Question is: Shall Senate Bill 26 be read for the third time? Roll call vote. 
(Roll call) 
JANUARY 23. 2002 DAY 3, TAPE 5 
PRESIDENT: We will now go to Senate Bill 26 
CLERK: Senate Bill 26, Serious Youth Offender Amendment, Senator Hillyard. 
PRESIDENT: Senator Hillyard? 
SENATOR HILLYARD: I explained this bill yesterday. It basically clarifies two issues with 
Serious Youth Offenders: 
Number one, if they're in a secured facility and attack a guard, they are not automatically 
transferred over to the adult system. 
Number two, if they get transferred over to the adult system and then for some reason they're 
found not guilty of the felony but of the misdemeanor, they still remain in the adult system. 
Once the juvenile system has expended its patience, programs and time on someone so they 
now get transferred over to the adult system, that's where they stay. 
No questions yesterday and it passed unanimously. 
PRESIDENT: Any other questions of Senator Hillyard on this today? (silence) Very good. 
I will now call for question on the bill. 
Question is: Shall Senate Bill 26 be read for the third time, up for final passage? Roll call 
vote. 
(Roll Call) 
HOLSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
FIFTY FOURTH LEGISLATURE 
JANUARY 30. 2002 DAY 1Q.T\PE 1 
(Representative Swallow, Senate Bill 26 Pass. 69 yes, 0 no ) 
REPRESENTATIVE SWALLOW- Thank you Mr Speaker. Motion to uncircle Senate Bill 
26, Senous Youth Offender Amendments. 
MR. SPEAKER: Motion is that we uncircle Senate Bill 26, Senous Youth Offender 
Amendments. Discussion of motion? Seeing none, all in favor say aye. 
REPRESENTATIVES: Aye. 
MR. SPEAKER: Opposed say no. Motion passes. Senate Bill 26 will be uncircled 
Representative Swallow? 
REP. SWALLOW: Thank you Mr. Speaker. Representatives, this bill makes two changes 
to the Senous Youth Offender statutes which permits certain juveniles to be tned in the 
distnct court. 
The first change deals with when a senous youth is referred to the distnct court, under the 
laws it currently constituted once a youth has been assigned to a secured facility, if that 
youth thereafter commits a felony, then they become subject to the junsdiction of the distnct 
court. Practically speaking what has happened is therefore a youth has committed a cnme, 
been sentenced to a secured facility and then has intentionally committed a felony while in 
custody to be able to go to the adult system and take advantage of some of the parole issues 
in the adult system and get an early release. So what this bill does first of all is it states that 
if that felony is committed while they're in custody in the juvenile system that does not 
automatically throw them into the adult system which I think is a wise policy 
The second change deals with the fact that when a juvenile is charged with a certain type of 
cnme they are automatically taken to the distnct court to be tned as an adult Later on a 
question anses that if they're not convicted of that cnme but they actually are convicted of 
a lesser cnme, who has junsdiction, the adult court (the distnct court) or the juvenile court7 
This bill clanfies that if they are charged w ith that adult cnme and convicted of a lesser cnme 
that distnct court still retains junsdiction over the juvenile and that avoids the conflict 
between junsdiction. With that I'm open to any questions on the bill 
MR SPEAKER Further discussion of Senate Bill 269 Seeing none, Representative Swallow 
for summation. 
REPRESENTATIVE SWALLOW: I'll waive summation. 
MR. SPEAKER: Summation is waived. Voting is open on Senate Bill 26. 
UTAH STATE SENATE 
FEBRUARY 1.2002 DAY 12, TAPE 19 
(Note on tape says "Hillyard motion call of Senate 
pass lift call pass motion to concur") 
PRESIDENT: Well lets go to the concurrent calendar, and we'll go to Senate Bill 26. 
CLERK: Senate Bill 26 is Serious Youth Offender amendment, Senator Hillyard. 
PRESIDENT: Alright. Senator Hillyard? 
SENATOR HILLYARD: I have a concern in handling the bill right now because the 
amendment was put in at my request. This is the Serious Youth Offender bill. Youth 
Corrections came to me and said could you please get this effective immediately because of 
the problems we're having with some of the cases of being referred back at district court. 
We are reversing a Utah court case that said "we don't know what the answer is but we're 
going to guess and if we're wrong the legislature will correct us." So we said, "you guessed 
wrong, we're correcting you." But I need to have 20 votes and so I'm looking to make sure 
I have. It passed unanimously here and it passed in the House. The concurrence is that 
we've inserted language making it effective immediately upon two thirds votes and signed 
by the Governor. 
PRESIDENT: Do you want a call of the Senate? 
SENATOR HILLYARD: I'll do a call of the Senate. If I can speak with the Senate to help 
me on that issue because I need to have . . . 
PRESIDENT: Do we have five senators standing? (silence) 
We're the call of Senate. 
SENATOR HILLYARD: Thank you. 
